'Leaving Nothing to Chance'?: Joint Tenancies, The 'Right' of Survivorship and Unilateral Severance

The joint tenancy with its inherent right of survivorship is the most prevalent form of co-ownership in the common law world today. Most couples will be joint tenants of a family home, while relations (such as siblings) who purchase property together may opt for this arrangement. Inter vivos acquisitions aside, the huge intergenerational transfer of wealth within families on death can result in a joint tenancy, and it may also be a convenient estate planning device. The fact that property automatically vests in the surviving joint tenants on death is the reason why many people choose this form of co-ownership. However, there is one serious disadvantage. A joint tenancy is an inflexible form of landholding where relationships sour or family circumstances change over time, and co-owners want their respective `shares' of the property to pass to someone else on death. Where consensual severance is not possible, one joint tenant can sever unilaterally. The latter mechanism is vital in terms of giving effect to the wishes of the severing joint tenant, especially in situations of discord or a breakdown in relations with their fellow co-owners. However, unilateral severance also has serious implications for the non-severing joint tenant(s) who expected to inherit property through survivorship, and can impact significantly on ownership of the home and other family property. This article looks at unilateral severance as a means of subverting the right of survivorship. The focus is on personal and inter-family relationships, and the various legal issues and policy considerations associated with unilateral severance across the common law jurisdictions of Britain, Ireland, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. It assesses the various methods of effecting unilateral severance and proposes specific measures, as well as considering novel arguments for preventing unilateral severance based on contractual agreements to the contrary and proprietary estoppel.

Quantum state transfer via temporal kicking of information

We propose a strategy for perfect state transfer in spin chains based on the use of an unmodulated coupling Hamiltonian whose coefficients are explicitly time dependent. We show that, if specific and nondemanding conditions are satisfied by the temporal behavior of the coupling strengths, our model allows perfect state transfer. The paradigm put forward by our proposal holds the promises to set an alternative standard to the use of clever encoding and coupling-strength engineering for perfect state transfer.

Fragility of information cascades: an experimental study using elicited beliefs

This paper examines the occurrence and fragility of information cascades in two laboratory experiments. One group of low informed participants sequentially guess which of two states has been randomly chosen. In a matched pairs design, another group of high informed participants make similar guesses after having observed the guesses of the low informed participants. In the second experiment, participants' beliefs about the chosen state are elicited. In equilibrium, low informed players who observe an established pattern of identical guesses herd without regard to their private information whereas high informed players always guess according to their private information. Equilibrium behavior implies that information cascades emerge in the group of low informed participants, the belief based solely on cascade guesses is stationary, and information cascades are systematically broken by high informed participants endowed with private information contradicting the cascade guesses. Experimental results show that the behavior of low informed participants is qualitatively in line with the equilibrium prediction. Information cascades often emerge in our experiments. The tendency of low informed participants to engage in cascade behavior increases with the number of identical guesses. Our main finding is that information cascades are not fragile. The behavior of high informed participants differs markedly from the equilibrium prediction. Only one-third of laboratory cascades are broken by high informed participants endowed with private information contradicting the cascade guesses. The relative frequency of cascade breaks is 15% for the situations where five or more identical guesses are observed. Participants' elicited beliefs are strongly consistent with their own behavior and show that, unlike in equilibrium, the more cascade guesses participants observe the more they believe in the state favored by those guesses.