Engaging with the European Union? Exploring the Europeanization of the British National Party

Hostility towards the process of European integration is generally considered to constitute one of the hallmarks of the far right ‘family’ in Europe. This article acknowledges such opposition but it also recognises that the rhetoric is often at odds with actual policy activities and aspirations. Not only have far right parties long advocated greater European inter-party co-operation but they are now actively pursuing engagement with the European Union, especially the European Parliament, as a means of advancing their own strategic interests and boosting their finances. This article focuses on one far right party, namely the British National Party (BNP) and examines the party's approach towards the EU, its activities within the EP and its efforts to boost pan European cooperation through the new Alliance of European National Movements (AENM). It argues that the party's engagement with the European Union may have allowed the BNP to take advantage of new political opportunity structures but in turn, opened it up to Europeanization and made it increasingly dependent on the EU.

Income, deprivation and economic stress in the enlarged European Union

At risk of poverty indicators based on relative income measures suggest that within the enlarged EU societies located at quite different points on a continuum of affluence have similar levels of poverty. Substantial differences in levels of income between societies do not in themselves invalidate this approach. However, the relative income approach fails to capture the fact that, if countries are grouped in terms of level of GDP, between economic cluster differences in life-style deprivation are sharper at lower income levels. Support for the argument relating to restricted reference groups is found in relation to the contrast between the twelve most affluent EU countries and all others. The limitations of relative income poverty lines have little to do with the process of enlargement as such. Instead the major problem involves the weak association between income and deprivation in the more affluent countries. However, as a consequence of such difficulties, such indicators do not provide entirely meaningful comparisons of levels of disadvantage across economic clusters. The current analysis, rather than supporting the alternative of a focus on absolute income or an EU wide poverty line, suggests that we should take the argument for adopting a multidimensional approach to the measurement of poverty more seriously.

Persistent income poverty and deprivation in the European Union: An analysis of the first three waves of the European Community Household Panel

Poverty research has increasingly focused on persistent income poverty, both as a crucial social indicator and as a target for policy intervention. Such an approach can lead to an identification of a sub-set of poor individuals facing particularly adverse circumstances and/or distinctive problems in escaping from poverty. Here we seek to establish whether, in comparison with cross-sectional measures, persistent poverty measures also provide a better measure of exclusion from a minimally acceptable way of life and relate with other important variables in a logical fashion. Our analysis draws upon the first three waves of the ECHP and shows that a persistent poverty measure does constitute a significant improvement over its cross-sectional counterpart in the explanation of levels of deprivation. Persistent poverty is related to life-style deprivation in a manner that comes close to being uniform across countries. The measure of persistence also conforms to our expectations of how a poverty measure should behave in that, unlike relative income poverty lines, defining the threshold level more stringently enables us to identify progressively groups of increasingly deprived respondents. Overall the persistent poverty measure constitutes a significant advance on cross-sectional income measures. However, there is clearly a great deal relating to the process of accumulation and of erosion of resources, which is not fully captured in the persistent poverty measure. In the absence of such information, there is a great deal to be said for making use of both types of indictors in formulating and evaluating policies while we continue to improve our understanding of longer-term processes.

European Union Cross-Border Cooperation and Conflict Amelioration

The relevance of European Union (EU) cross-border cooperation for European border con?ict amelioration may be questioned in the contemporary global climate of threat and insecurity posed by forces of ’dark globalisation’. In any case, empirical evidence exposes the limitations of cross-border cooperation in advancing con?ict amelioration in some border regions. Nevertheless, in an enlarged EU which encompasses Central and East European member states and reaches out to neighbouring states through cross-border cooperation initiatives, the number of real and potential border con?icts with which it is concerned has risen exponentially. Fortunately, there are cases of EU ’borderscapes’ that have adopted a cross-border ’peace-building from below’ approach leading to border con?ict amelioration. Unfortunately, countervailing pressures on EU cross-border cooperation from border security regimes (principally Schengen), the Eurozone crisis, EU budgetary constraints, the conceptualisation of ’Europe as Empire’, and the possible recon?guration of the EU itself compromises this approach. Therefore, the path of European integration may well shift from one of inter-state peace-building and regional crossborder cooperation after the Second World War, to border con?ict and coercion in constituting and reconstituting state borders after the recon?guration of the EU.

The European Union and Peacebuilding: The Cross-Border Dimension

The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to the European Union in 2012 was a reminder of the role of European integration in peacebuilding after the Second World War. For the 'Founding Fathers' of the European integration project, cross-border-cooperation was an integral element in building Europe's peace. Yet, in a Western Europe largely at peace for generations, peacebuilding as a relevant objective for European integration may be questioned. Moreover, the contribution of cross-border cooperation to conflict amelioration may be challenged on the grounds of its overwhelming economic focus. However, enlargement into Central Eastern Europe highlights once again the necessity of a peacebuilding objective for the European Union because of the multitude of real and potential conflicts encompassed within its expanded policy orbit. Drawing on evidence from selected 'borderscapes', this study examines 25 years of European Union cross-border cooperation as conflict amelioration and assesses its prospects in a political climate that emphasises borders as security barriers.

'Battling in Brussels': The DUP and the European union

Although the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) does not conform to the model of Europeanization outlined by Ladrech (2002), there is some evidence of change along the lines identified by De Winter and Gomez-Reino (2002) with reference to other European ethnoregionalist parties. For example, the DUP has certainly adapted its behaviour and policies at both local and European levels with a view to exploiting new political opportunities offered by Europeanization. However, De Winter and Gomez-Reino's argument that participation in European institutions has made formerly-Eurosceptic ethnoregionalist parties 'moderate Eurocritics' does not fully apply to the DUP. The DUP continues to demonstrate a number of Eurosceptic characteristics, including ones grounded in extreme religious interpretations of the purpose and process of European integration. Nevertheless, the party's Eurosceptic outlook does not prevent it from being willing to 'battle in Brussels' (as put in its 2009 manifesto for the European elections) in order to serve domestic (party) interests - a tactic not dissimilar to the DUP's approach to Northern Ireland politics in general.

A Constitution of Social Governance for the European Union

This chapter considers the EU’s socio-economic constitution under the lens of humaneness. It argues that the EU’s unique socio-economic constitution demands equilibrium of socio-economic integration instead of widening the gap between economic integration at EU levels and social integration at national levels. While the EU lacks the legislative competences to achieve this equilibrium, the constitutional principle still prevails. Indeed, the EU competences reflect its own values as well as the socio-economic constitutions of its constituent Member States. These frequently do not allow for total state-governance of social spheres such as working life, education, care or other social services. Instead, societal actors are given scope to (co-)govern these spheres at national levels. Accordingly, the apparent tension between the EU’s socio-economic values and principles and its limited competences in the social policy field can be resolved through a dynamic interpretation of the EU Treaties towards a “constitution of social governance”. This interpretation reads the Treaties as authorising governance by societal actors. The chapter connects the idea of humanness to the ideals of social governance at EU level and proposes two options for practical application of the concept. These are rules for trans-national labour markets based on European collective labour agreements and a European higher education sector developed by agreements between universities.

A Constitution of Social Governance for the European Union

his chapter considers the EU’s socio-economic constitution under the lens of humaneness. It argues that the EU’s unique socio-economic constitution demands equilibrium of socio-economic integration instead of widening the gap between economic integration at EU levels and social integration at national levels. While the EU lacks the legislative competences to achieve this equilibrium, the constitutional principle still prevails. Indeed, the EU competences reflect its own values as well as the socio-economic constitutions of its constituent Member States. These frequently do not allow for total state-governance of social spheres such as working life, education, care or other social services. Instead, societal actors are given scope to (co-)govern these spheres at national levels. Accordingly, the apparent tension between the EU’s socio-economic values and principles and its limited competences in the social policy field can be resolved through a dynamic interpretation of the EU Treaties towards a “constitution of social governance”. This interpretation reads the Treaties as authorising governance by societal actors. The chapter connects the idea of humanness to the ideals of social governance at EU level and proposes two options for practical application of the concept. These are rules for trans-national labour markets based on European collective labour agreements and a European higher education sector developed by agreements between universities.

European Union Cross-Border Cooperation as Conflict Transformation:Potential and Limits

Cross-border cooperation as conflict transformation provides a potential strategy for the European Union (EU) to help realise its founding peacebuilding objective. A wealth of cross-border cooperation activity sponsored by the EU spans a quarter of a century. Although the conflict transformation capacity of that cooperation is questionable in some border regions there is evidence to suggest that it has delivered peacebuilding dividends in other border regions. However, EU cross-border cooperation as conflict transformation faces a number of significant twenty-first century challenges including: ghost borders of the communal imagination; EU external border securitization; perceptions of EU and Russian empire-building; and the Mediterranean transmigrant/refugee crisis. It is argued that these challenges pose significant obstacles to EU cross-border cooperation as conflict transformation and undermine the peacebuilding objective of European integration.

Does the European Union have a reverse gear? Policy dismantling in a hyperconsensual polity

The financial crisis has triggered demands to halt and even reverse the expansion of European Union (EU) policies. But have these and previous demands actually resulted in policy dismantling? The existing literature has charted the rise of dismantling discourses such as subsidiarity and better regulation, but has not examined the net effect on the acquis. For the first time, this contribution addresses this gap in the literature through an empirical study of policy change between 1992 and 2014. It is guided by a coding framework which captures the direction of policy change. It reveals that, despite its disposition towards consensualism, the EU has become a new locus of policy dismantling. However, not all policies targeted have been cut; many have stayed the same and some have even expanded. It concludes by identifying new directions for research on a topic that has continually fallen into the analytical blind spot of EU scholars.