Stateful Intrusion Detection for IEC 60870-5-104 SCADA Security

Cyber threats in Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems have the potential to render physical damage and jeopardize power system operation, safety and stability. SCADA systems were originally designed with little consideration of escalating cyber threats and hence the problem of how to develop robust intrusion detection technologies to tailor the requirements of SCADA is an emerging topic and a big challenge. This paper proposes a stateful Intrusion Detection System (IDS) using a Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) method to improve the cyber-security of SCADA systems using the IEC 60870-5-104 protocol which is tailored for basic telecontrol communications. The proposed stateful protocol analysis approach is presented that is designed specifically for the IEC 60870-5-104 protocol. Finally, the novel intrusion detection approach are implemented and validated.

Towards an Improved Phasor Measurement Unit Data Communications Framework

This paper discusses a proposed new communications framework for phasor measurement units (PMU) optimized for use on wide area networks. Traditional PMU telecoms have been optimized for use in environments where bandwidth is restricted. The new method takes the reliability of the telecommunications medium into account and provides guaranteed delivery of data whilst optimizing for realtime delivery of the most current data. Other important aspects, such as security, are also considered.

On the Security of Balanced Encoding Countermeasures

Most cryptographic devices should inevitably have a resistance against the threat of side channel attacks. For this, masking and hiding schemes have been proposed since 1999. The security validation of these countermeasures is an ongoing research topic, as a wider range of new and existing attack techniques are tested against these countermeasures. This paper examines the side channel security of the balanced encoding countermeasure, whose aim is to process the secret key-related data under a constant Hamming weight and/or Hamming distance leakage. Unlike previous works, we assume that the leakage model coefficients conform to a normal distribution, producing a model with closer fidelity to real-world implementations. We perform analysis on the balanced encoded PRINCE block cipher with simulated leakage model and also an implementation on an AVR board. We consider both standard correlation power analysis (CPA) and bit-wise CPA. We confirm the resistance of the countermeasure against standard CPA, however, we find with a bit-wise CPA that we can reveal the key with only a few thousands traces.