Participation of Smallholders in Agroforestry Agri-Environmental Scheme: A lesson from the rural Mount Kenya region

The likelihood of smallholder farmers not participating in agroforestry agri-environmental schemes and payments for ecosystem services (PES) may be due to limited farmland endowment and formal credit constraints. These deficits may lead to an ‘exclusive club’ of successful farmers, which are not necessarily poor, enjoying the benefits of agri-environmental schemes and PES although agrienvironmental schemes and PES have been devised as a means of fostering rural sustainable development and improving the livelihood of poor smallholder farmers. Smallholder farmers in parts of rural Kenya continue to enroll in ‘The International Small Group Tree Planting Programme’ (TIST), an agri-environmental scheme, promoting agroforestry, carbon sequestration and conservation agriculture (CA). The question remains if these farmers are really poor? This study examines factors that determine the participation of smallholder farmers in TIST in parts of rural Kenya. We use survey data compiled in 2013 on 210 randomly selected smallholder farmers from Embu, Meru and Nanyuki communities; the sample consists of TIST and non-TIST members. A random utility model and logit regression were used to test a set of non-monetary and monetary factors that influence participation in the TIST. The utility function is conceptualized to give non-monetary factors, particularly the common medium of communication in rural areas – formal and informal – a central role. Furthermore, we investigate other factors (incl. credit accessibility and interest rate) that reveal the nature of farmers participating in TIST. The findings suggest that spread of information via formal and informal networks is a major driver of participation in the TIST program. Furthermore, variables such credit constrains, age and labour supply positively correlate with TIST participation, while for education the opposite is true. It is important to mention that these correlations, although somewhat consistent, were all found to be weak. The results indicate that participation in the TIST program is not influenced by farm size; therefore we argue that the TIST scheme is NOT an ‘exclusive club’ comprising wealthy and successful farmers. Older farmers’ being more likely to join the TIST is an argument for their long- rather than widely assumed short-term planning horizon and a new contribution to the literature. Given the importance of poverty alleviation and climate smart agriculture in developing countries, sustainable policy should strengthening the social and human capital as well as informal networks in rural areas. Extension services should effectively communicate benefits to less educated and credit constrained farmers.

Movement of Capital and Trade in Services:Distinguishing Myth from Reality Regarding the GATS and the Liberalization of the Capital Account

This article will analyze the interplay between capital movements and trade
in services as structured in World Trade Organization (WTO) law, and it will
assess the implications of the capital account liberalization for the freedom of
WTO Members to pursue their economic policies. Although the movement
of capital is largely confined to the domain of international financial or monetary
policy, it is regulated by WTO law due to its role in the process of
financial services liberalization, which generally requires liberalized capital
flows. From a legal perspective, the interplay between capital movements
and trade in services requires striking a delicate balance between the right
of market access and the parallel right of economic stability. Indeed, a liberalized
regime for capital movements could pose serious stability problems
during times of crisis. For this reason, it is necessary that Members are able
to derogate from their obligations and adopt emergency measures.
Regulating the movement of capital in the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) requires stretching the regulatory oversight of WTO law
over different aspects of international economic policy. Indeed, capital movements are a fundamental component of the balance of payments and have a
major role in shaping monetary, fiscal, and financial policies. This article will
analyze how the discipline provided by the GATS on capital movements will
affect not only trade in services, but also the Members’ policy space on
monetary and fiscal policy. The article will conclude that while the GATS offers enough policy space for the maintenance of financial stability, it does
not fully take into consideration the need of Members to control capital
movements in order to conduct monetary policies.

The International Regulatory Regime on Capital Flows

Capital controls and exchange restrictions are used to restrict international capital flows during economic crises. This paper looks at the legal implications of these restrictions and explores the current international regulatory framework applicable to international capital movements and current payments. It shows how international capital flows suffer from the lack of a comprehensive and coherent regulatory framework that would harmonize the patchwork of
multilateral, regional, and bilateral treaties that currently regulate this issue. These treaties include the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF Articles), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), free-trade agreements, the European Union treaty, bilateral investment treaties, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements (OECD Code of Capital Movement). Each
of these instruments regulate differently capital movements with little coordination with other areas of law. This situation sometimes leads to regulatory overlaps and conflict between different sources of law. Given the strong links between capital movements and trade in services, this paper pays particular attention to the rules of the GATS on capital flows and discusses the policy space available in the GATS for restricting capital flows in times of crisis.