Civic Republicanism and Green Political Theory

Republicanism and in particular the civic republican tradition is not often one that one finds in discusions and debates within green political theory. It is interesting to note the relative lack of engagement between republican political theory and green political theory, unlike for example the research one can find on the relationship between green politics/political theory and liberalism, socialism and feminism. This is remarkable, given, as I hope to establish in this paper, the large areas of overlap between both, and in particular the compatibility of republican ideas and positions with key priciples and objectives of green theory, paricularly in relation to active citizenship, the centrality of recognising vulnerability and a commitment to liberty (as non-domination) and pluralism as key components of the transition to a more sustainable society.

Justice as Fairness in Planning Policy-Making

This paper considers a moral basis for planning theory and endeavours to establish principles of justice which might be relevant to the regulation of development. Whilst the investigation recognises that there is a need for a deeper understanding of the dynamics of governance, it suggests that many of the inefficiencies, inequities and public disquiet concerns relating to planning centre on a drift from a perception that the system is both fair and just, and that practice needs to be anchored on founding values concerned with redistribution and equality. In this context, John Rawls’ theory of justice is employed as a vehicle to capture moral ideas of equality and liberty within a constitutional democracy and as a basis for scrutinising emerging justice based issues which impact upon planning. Using National Policy Statements as a case study, the paper concludes that, whilst there are serious concerns over current policymaking practices, the principles of justice offer a foundation for practical critique which can help overcome problems of mistrust.

Treatment Foster Care for improving outcomes in children and young people (Review)

Background: Treatment foster care (TFC) is a foster family-based intervention that aims to provide young people (and, where appropriate, their families) with a tailored programme designed to effect positive changes in their lives. TFC was designed specifically to cater for the needs of children whose difficulties or circumstances place them at risk of multiple placements and/or more restrictive placements such as hospital or secure residential or youth justice settings.

Objectives: To assess the impact of TFC on psychosocial and behavioural outcomes, delinquency, placement stability, and discharge status for children and adolescents who require out-of-home placement.

Search methods: We searched the Cochrane Controlled Trials Register (CENTRAL) 2006 (Issue 4), MEDLINE (1966 to January 2007), CINAHL (1982 to December 2006), PsycINFO (1872 to January 2007), ASSIA (1987 to January 2007), LILACS (1982 to January 2007), ERIC (1966 to January 2007), Sociological Abstracts (1963 to January 2007), and the National Research Register 2006 (Issue 4).

Selection criteria: Included studies were randomised controlled trials investigating the effectiveness of TFC with children and young people up to the age of 18 who, for reasons of severe medical, social, psychological and behavioural problems, were placed in out of home care in restrictive settings (e.g. secure residential care, psychiatric hospital) or at risk of placement in such settings.

Data collection and analysis: Titles and abstracts identified in the search were independently assessed for eligibility by the two authors (GM and WT) who also extracted and entered into REVMAN. Date were synthesised on the few occasions where this was possible. Results are presented in tabular, graphical (forest plots) and textual form.

Main results: Five studies including 390 participants were included in this review. Data suggest that treatment foster care may be a useful intervention for children and young people with complex emotional, psychological and behavioural need, who are at risk of placements in nonfamily settings that restrict their liberty and opportunities for social inclusion.

Authors’ conclusions: Although the inclusion criteria for this systematic review set a study design threshold higher than that of previous reviews, the results mirror those of earlier reviews but also highlights the tendency of the perceived effectiveness of popular interventions to outstrip their evidence base. Whilst the results of individual studies generally indicate that TFC is a promising intervention for children and youth experiencing mental health problems, behavioural problems or problems of delinquency, the evidence base is less robust than that usually reported.The Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews is a peer reviewed, international journal, published electronically each month. The 2010 Inpact Factor for the Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews was 6.185.The CDSR is now ranked in the top 10 of the 151 in the Medicine, General & Internal category.

Ecological and societal benefits of jellyfish blooms

Jellyfish are often considered as stressors on marine ecosystems or as indicators of highly perturbed systems. Far less attention is given to the potential of such species to provide beneficial ecosystem services in their own right. In an attempt to redress this imbalance we take the liberty of portraying jellyfish in a positive light and suggest that the story is not entirely one of doom and gloom. More specifically, we outline how gelatinous marine species contribute to the four categories of ecosystem services (regulating, supporting, provisioning and cultural) defined by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. This discussion ranges from the role of jellyfish in carbon capture and advection to the deep ocean through to the creation of micro habitat for developing fishes and the advancement of citizen science programmes. Attention is paid also to incorporation of gelatinous species into fisheries or ecosystem level models and the mechanisms by which we can improve the transfer of information between jellyfish researchers and the wider non-specialist community.

Legislating about Unhealthy Food: A Millian Approach

Tackling food-related health conditions is becoming one of the most pressing issues in the policy agendas of western liberal democratic governments. In this article, I intend to illustrate what the liberal philosopher John Stuart Mill would have said about legislation on unhealthy food and I focus especially on the arguments advanced by Mill in his classic essay On Liberty ([1859] 2006). Mill is normally considered as the archetype of liberal anti-paternalism and his ideas are often invoked by those who oppose state paternalism, including those who reject legislation that restricts the consumption of unhealthy food. Furthermore, his views have been applied to related policy areas such as alcohol minimum pricing (Saunders 2013) and genetically modified food (Holtug 2001). My analysis proceeds as follows. First, I show that Mill’s account warrants some restrictions on food advertising and justifies various forms of food labelling. Second, I assess whether and to what extent Mill’s ‘harm principle’ justifies social and legal non-paternalistic penalties against unhealthy eaters who are guilty of other-regarding harm. Finally, I show that Mill’s account warrants taxing unhealthy foods, thus restricting the freedom of both responsible and irresponsible eaters and de facto justifying what I call ‘secondary paternalism’.

Proportionality in Age Discrimination Cases - a Model Suitable for Socially Embedded Rights

This chapter discusses the use of proportionality in age discrimination cases before the Court of Justice of the European Union. It argues that the Court does not use this concept systematically - indeed it exposes some contradiction that make the case law seem arbitrary - and proposes a more fruitful use of the principle, which is in line with a modern conception of human rights. The chapter argues that the principle of proportionality stems from the time when human rights served the recently liberated burgeois elite in guarding their rights to property and liberty against the state. Today, states not only respect human rights (which is fully sufficient for this elite, who can rely on their inherited wealth to fend for themselves). They also protect and promote human rights, and these activities are a precondition for human rights to be practically relevant for the whole population. This also means that state activity, which is experienced as a limitation of rights to property and liberty by some, may constitute a measure to promote and protect human rights of others. In employment law - the only field where the EU ban on age discrimination is applied - this is a typical situation. If such a situation occurs, the principle of proportionality must be applied in a bifurcated way.It is not sufficient that the limitation of property rights is proportionate for the achievement of a public policy aim. If the aim of public policy is to enable the effective use of human rights, the limitation of the state action must be proportionate to the protection and promotion of those human rights. It is argued that the principle of proportionality is superior to less structures balancing acts (e.g. the Wednesbury principle), if it is applied both ways. Going over to the field of age discrimination, the chapter identifies a number of potentially colliding aims pursued in this field. Banning age discrimination may relate to genuine aims of anti-discrimination law if bias against older or very young workers is addressed. However, the EU ban of discrimination against all ages also serves to restructure employment law and policy to the age of flexibilisation, replacing the synchronisation principle that has been predominant for the welfare states of the 20th century. The former aim is related to human rights protection, while the latter aim is not (at least not always). This has consequences for applying the proportionality test. The chapter proposes different ways to argue the most difficult age discrimination cases, where anti-discrimination rationales and flexibilisation rationales clash

Constitutional Questions

Constitutional Questions
Professor John Morison MRIA School of Law, Queen’s University Belfast
How should we live together? Is there any ethical question more fundamental than this?
Is a constitution only about who does what in government or is it about what is to be done? Does a constitution provide the ground rules for deciding this or is it part of the answer itself? Is it the repository of fundamental values about how to live? What is the good life anyway? Is it about the preservation of life and liberty, and the pursuit of happiness? Or something more? What about preserving (or radically reordering) the distribution of property? Or ensuring that everyone has the same chances? Is it the job of the constitution to simply promise dignity, equality and freedom, or to deliver these values?
If the constitution is the place where the state undertakes “to promote the welfare of the whole people”, what does this actually mean in practical terms? And who pays for it? Should a constitution give us an entitlement to at least a basic minimum by way of a lifestyle? Or is it the job only of the political process to decide issues about the allocation of resources? What do we do if we feel that we cannot trust our politicians? Are there basic rules that should govern the operation of politics and are there fundamental values that should not be overridden? Are these “sacred and undeniable”? Or to be interpreted in line with modern conditions and within a “margin of appreciation”? Who decides on this in individual cases?
Who is entitled to any of this, and on what basis? Is everyone equal? Is the constitution about making it clear that no-one is better than you, and that in turn, you are better than no-one? Is a constitution about ensuring that you will always be an end in yourself and never simply a means to anyone else’s end? Or does it simply reinforce the existing distribution of power and wealth?
Are citizens to be given more than those who are not citizens? Is more to be expected from them, and what might that be? Can the constitution tell us how we should treat those from outside who now live with us?
What is the relationship between a constitution and a nation? Who is in the nation anyway? Should we talk about “we the people” or “we the peoples”? Should a constitution confirm a nationality or facilitate diversity? Is the constitution the place to declare aspirations for a national territory? Or to confirm support for the idea of consent? What about all our neighbours – on the island of Ireland and in Great Britain? Or in Europe? And beyond?
What is the relationship between a constitution and democracy? Is a constitution simply the rules by which the powerful govern the powerless? In what sense does a constitution belong to everyone, across past, present and future generations? Is it the place where we state common values? Are there any? Do they change across time? Should the people be asked about changes they may want? How often should this be done? Should the constitution address the past and its problems? How might this be done? What do we owe future generations?
Finally, if we can agree that the constitution is about respecting human rights, striving for social justice and building a fair and democratic Ireland – North and South – how do we make it happen in practice?