Income ineqaulity from 1960-2012: a brief time-series history of capital and labour

This commentary examines two principal forms of inequality and their evolution since the 1960s: the division of national income between capital and labour, and the share of total income held by the top 1 per cent of earners. Trends are linked to current discussions of inequality drivers such as financialisation, and a brief time-series analysis of the effects of trade and financial sector growth on top incomes is presented.

When did Britain industrialise? The sectoral distribution of the labour force and labour productivity in Britain, 1381-1851

Britain's labour force industrialised early. The industrial and service sectors already accounted for 40% of the labour force in 1381, and a substantial further shift of labour out of agriculture occurred between 1522 and 1700. From the early seventeenth century rising agricultural labour productivity underpinned steadily increasing employment in industry and services, so that by 1759 agriculture's share of the labour force had shrunk to 37% and industry's grown to 34%. Thereafter, industry's output acceleration during the Industrial Revolution owed more to gains in labour productivity consequent upon mechanisation than the expansion of employment.

Labour Law as Human Rights Law: A Critique of the Use of ‘Dignity’ by Freedland and Kountouris

In their recent book, The Legal Construction of Personal Work Relations, Mark Freedland and Nicola Kountouris present an ambitious study of the personal scope of (what they would not want to call) ‘employment’ law. The book does this within a broader argument that calls for the reconceptualization of labour law as a whole, and it is this broader argument on which I shall focus in this chapter. Their aim, in urging us to see labour law through the lens of ‘dignity’ is to bring labour law and human rights law into closer alignment than has sometimes been the case in the past. Increasingly, dignity is seen as providing a, sometimes the, foundation of human rights law, particularly in Europe. I shall suggest that whilst the aim of constructing a new set of foundations for labour law is a worthy and increasingly urgent task, the concepts on which Freedland and Kountouris seek to build their project pose significant difficulties. In particular, their espousal of ‘dignity’ presents problems that must be addressed if their reconceptualization is not to prove a blind alley.