Seasonal variations in nitrate reductase activity and internal N pools in intertidal brown algae are correlated with ambient nitrate concentrations.

Nitrogen metabolism was examined in the intertidal seaweeds Fucus vesiculosus, Fucus serratus, Fucus spiralis and Laminaria digitata in a temperate Irish sea lough. Internal NO3- storage, total N content and nitrate reductase activity (NRA) were most affected by ambient NO3-, with highest values in winter, when ambient NO3- was maximum, and declined with NO3- during summer. In all species, NRA was six times higher in winter than in summer, and was markedly higher in Fucus species (e.g. 256 ± 33 nmol NO3- min1 g1 in F. vesiculosus versus 55 ± 17 nmol NO3- min1 g1 in L. digitata). Temperature and light were less important factors for N metabolism, but influenced in situ photosynthesis and respiration rates. NO3- assimilating capacity (calculated from NRA) exceeded N demand (calculated from net photosynthesis rates and C : N ratios) by a factor of 0.7–50.0, yet seaweeds stored significant NO3- (up to 40–86 µmol g1). C : N ratio also increased with height in the intertidal zone (lowest in L. digitata and highest in F. spiralis), indicating that tidal emersion also significantly constrained N metabolism. These results suggest that, in contrast to the tight relationship between N and C metabolism in many microalgae, N and C metabolism could be uncoupled in marine macroalgae, which might be an important adaptation to the intertidal environment.

A bargaining set for monotonic simple games based on external and internal stability

A new bargaining set based on notions of both internal and external stability is developed in the context of endogenous coalition formation. It allows to make an explicit distinction between within-group and outside-group deviation options. This type of distinction is not present in current bargaining sets. For the class of monotonic proper simple games, the outcomes in the bargaining set are characterized. Furthermore, it is shown that the bargaining set of any homogeneous weighted majority game contains an outcome for which the underlying coalition structure consists of a minimal winning coalition and its complement.