The uncritical realism of realist evaluation

This article is a response to Ray Pawson’s critique of critical realism, the philosophy of science elaborated by Roy Bhaskar. I argue with Pawson’s interpretation of critical realism’s positions on both natural and social science and his charges concerning its totalizing ontology, its arrogant epistemology and its naive methodology. The differences between critical realism and realist evaluation are not as significant as Pawson contends. The main differences between the two realisms lie in their approaches to the relationship between social structures and human agency, and between facts and values. I argue that evaluation scientists need to clearly distinguish structure and agency. They should also make their values explicit. The uncritical approach of realist evaluation, combined with its underplaying of the importance of agency, leaves it open to implication in the abuses of bureaucratic instrumentalism.

Managing for Legitimacy: Agency Governance in its “Deep” Constitutional Context

Recent literature on bureaucratic structure has gone further than studying discretions given to bureaucrats in policy making, and much attention is now paid to understanding how bureaucratic agencies are managed. This article proposes that the way in which executive governments manage their agencies varies according to their constitutional setting and that this relationship is driven by considerations of the executive’s governing legitimacy. Inspired by Tilly (1984), we compare patterns of agency governance in Hong Kong and Ireland, in particular configurations of assigned decision-making autonomies and control mechanisms. This comparison shows that in governing their agencies the elected government of Ireland’s parliamentary democracy pays more attention to input (i.e. democratic) legitimacy while the executive government of Hong Kong’s administrative state favors output (i.e. performance) legitimacy. These different forms of autonomy and control mechanism reflect different constitutional models of how political executives acquire and sustain their governing legitimacy.

Decentralized Bribery and Market Participation

I propose a bribery model that examines decentralized bureaucratic decisionmaking. There are multiple stable equilibria. High levels of bribery reduce an economy's productivity because corruption suppresses small business, and reduces the total graft even though individual bribe size might increase. Decentralization prevents movement towards a Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Anti-corruption efforts, even temporary ones, might be useful to improve participation if they lower demanded bribe levels and thus encourage small businesses to participate.

Reforming the Westminster Model of Agency Governance: Britain and Ireland after the Crisis

Conventional understandings of what the Westminster model implies anticipate reliance on a top-down, hierarchical approach to budgetary accountability, reinforced by a post–New Public Management emphasis on recentralizing administrative capacity. This article, based on a comparative analysis of the experiences of Britain and Ireland, argues that the Westminster model of bureaucratic control and oversight itself has been evolving, hastened in large part due to the global financial crisis. Governments have gained stronger controls over the structures and practices of agencies, but agencies are also key players in securing better governance outcomes. The implication is that the crisis has not seen a return to the archetypal command-and-control model, nor a wholly new implementation of negotiated European-type practices, but rather a new accountability balance between elements of the Westminster system itself that have not previously been well understood.

Institutional Hybridity in Public Sector Reform: Replacement, Blending, or Layering of Administrative Paradigms

Despite an abundance of studies on hybridization and hybrid forms of organizing, scholarly work has failed to distinguish consistently between specific types of hybridity. As a consequence, the analytical category has become blurred and lacks conceptual clarity. Our paper discusses hybridity as the simultaneous appearance of institutional logics in organizational contexts, and differentiates the parallel co-existence of logics from transitional combinations (eventually leading to the replacement of a logic) and more robust combinations in the form of layering and blending. While blending refers to hybridity as an ‘amalgamate’ with original components that are no longer discernible, the notion of layering conceptualizes hybridity in a way that the various elements, or clusters thereof, are added on top of, or alongside, each other, similar to sediment layers in geology. We illustrate and substantiate such conceptual differentiation with an empirical study of the dynamics of public sector reform. In more detail, we examine the parliamentary discourse around two major reforms of the Austrian Federal Budget Law in 1986 and in 2007/2009 in order to trace administrative (reform) paradigms. Each of the three identified paradigms manifests a specific field-level logic with implications for the state and its administration: bureaucracy in Weberian-style Public Administration, market-capitalism in New Public Management, and democracy in New Public Governance. We find no indication of a parallel co-existence or transitional combination of logics, but hybridity in the form of robust combinations. We explore how new ideas fundamentally build on – and are made resonant with – the central bureaucratic logic in a way that suggests layering rather than blending. The conceptual findings presented in our article have implications for the literature on institutional analysis and institutional hybridity.

Trends in Approval Times for Genetically Engineered Crops in the United States and the European Union

Genetically engineered (GE) crops are subject to regulatory oversight to ensure their safety for humans and the environment. Their approval in the European Union (EU) starts with an application in a given Member State followed by a scientific step (risk assessment), and ends with a political decision-making step (risk management); and in the United States (US) it starts with a scientific (field trial) step and ends with a ‘bureaucratic’ decision-making step. We investigated trends for the time taken for these steps and the overall time taken for approving GE crops in the US and the EU (traders in these commodities). Results show that from 1996-2015 the overall time trend for approval in the EU decreased and then flattened off, with an overall mean completion-time of 1,763 days. In the US in 1998 there was a break in the trend of the overall approval time: Initially, from 1988 until 1997 the trend decreased with a mean approval time of 1,321 days; from 1998-2015, the trend almost stagnated with a mean approval time of 2,467 days.

Unwilling Executioner:Crime Fiction and the State

What gives crime fiction its distinctive shape and form? What makes it such a compelling vehicle of social and political critique? Unwilling Executioner argues that the answer lies in the emerging genre's complex and intimate relationship with the bureaucratic state and modern capitalism, and the contradictions that ensue when the state assumes control of the justice system. This study offers a dramatic new interpretation of the genre's emergence and evolution over a three hundred year period and as a genuinely transnational phenomenon.

No Time for Muses:The Research Excellence Framework and the Pursuit of Mediocrity

The chapter examines why the REF is bureaucratic bunk that is gutting the UK university system of intellectual integrity and ingenuity.