Efficient FPGA Hardware Development: A Multi-Language Approach

This paper presents a multi-language framework to FPGA hardware development which aims to satisfy the dual requirement of high-level hardware design and efficient hardware implementation. The central idea of this framework is the integration of different hardware languages in a way that harnesses the best features of each language. This is illustrated in this paper by the integration of two hardware languages in the form of HIDE: a structured hardware language which provides more abstract and elegant hardware descriptions and compositions than are possible in traditional hardware description languages such as VHDL or Verilog, and Handel-C: an ANSI C-like hardware language which allows software and hardware engineers alike to target FPGAs from high-level algorithmic descriptions. On the one hand, HIDE has proven to be very successful in the description and generation of highly optimised parameterisable FPGA circuits from geometric descriptions. On the other hand, Handel-C has also proven to be very successful in the rapid design and prototyping of FPGA circuits from algorithmic application descriptions. The proposed integrated framework hence harnesses HIDE for the generation of highly optimised circuits for regular parts of algorithms, while Handel-C is used as a top-level design language from which HIDE functionality is dynamically invoked. The overall message of this paper posits that there need not be an exclusive choice between different hardware design flows. Rather, an integrated framework where different design flows can seamlessly interoperate should be adopted. Although the idea might seem simple prima facie, it could have serious implications on the design of future generations of hardware languages.

Greek-Turkish Dilemmas and the Cyprus-EU Accession Process

This article compares the processes of foreign policymaking in Greece and Turkey in order to examine why the incentives and pressures of the enlargement process have failed until now to initiate a settlement in the Cyprus bicommunal negotiations. While most studies on the Cyprus problem have focused on the two communities of the island, little at-tention has been paid to the policies of the two â??motherlandsâ??, namely Greece and Turkey. Yet their leverage on the two Cypriot communities and their conflicting expectations with regard to an enlarged Europe in the Eastern Mediterranean constitute a complex security puzzle. The Republic of Cyprus stands as a champion candidate member for the next enlargement, amid fears of Turkish reprisals and hopes for a po-litical settlement on the island. With the benefits of settlement overwhelming the benefits of any other alternative, it is paradoxical that the parties seem to be about to fail to reach a last-minute, mutually beneficial compromise. I try to resolve this paradox by supplementing rational choice theory with cognitivist theories of international relations. While rational choice predicts a direct relationship between external environment and foreign policy shifts, the case of Cyprus suggests that this relationship is actually indirect. Without understanding how the external environment is framed in the domestic political discourse of Greece and Turkey, it is impossible to demonstrate how outside pressure and incentives affect foreign policy shifts.

Ownership Patterns and Control in Turkish Listed Companies

The purpose of this paper is to document the prevalent ownership concentration, structure and control in the top 100 companies listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange. The results are discussed in the context of emerging corporate governance trends in Turkey. Where appropriate, comparisons with other countries are provided. The results of the study indicate that ownership of Turkish companies is highly concentrated, families being the dominant shareholders. The separation of ownership and control among Turkish companies is mainly achieved through pyramidal ownership structures and the presence of big business groups. However, the cash flow and voting rights in Turkish companies are relatively more aligned compared to other family–ownership–dominated insider–system countries.