Dignity and the Challenge to Liberty :Reading Andras Sajo's Constitutional Sentiments

This paper considers debates about the anti-liberal tendencies of the concept of “human dignity”, in particular those conceptions that are “expressivist”. My aim is to examine how far conceptions of dignity are expressivist, and if so what problems the concept of dignity understood in this way poses for liberty. I consider concerns about dignity’s potential illiberality, in particular the potential illiberality of respect-based conceptions of dignity, in the context of Professor András Sajó’s recent writing, illustrating the discussion with examples drawn from recent judicial decisions of the European Court of Human Rights regarding freedom of speech.

Partial Cooperation in Strategic Decision Situations

We consider a normal form game in which there is a single exogenously given coalition of cooperating players that can write a binding agreement on pre-selected actions. These collective actions typically represent a certain number of dimensions in the players’ strategy space. The actions represented by the other dimensions of the strategy space remain under the complete, individual control of the players.
We consider a standard extension of the Nash equilibrium concept denoted as a partial cooperative equilibrium as well as an equilibrium concept in which the coalition of cooperators has a leadership position. Existence results are developed for these new equilibrium concepts. We identify conditions on these partial cooperative games under which the various equilibrium concepts are equivalent.
We apply this game theoretic framework to existing models of multi-market oligopolies and international pollution abatement. In a multi-market oligopoly typically a merger paradox emerges in the partial cooperative equilibrium, which vanishes if the cartel of collaborators exploits its leadership position. Our application to international pollution abatement treaties shows that cooperation by a sufficiently large group of countries results in a Pareto improvement over the standard tragedy of the commons outcome described by the Nash equilibrium.