A bargaining set for monotonic simple games based on external and internal stability

A new bargaining set based on notions of both internal and external stability is developed in the context of endogenous coalition formation. It allows to make an explicit distinction between within-group and outside-group deviation options. This type of distinction is not present in current bargaining sets. For the class of monotonic proper simple games, the outcomes in the bargaining set are characterized. Furthermore, it is shown that the bargaining set of any homogeneous weighted majority game contains an outcome for which the underlying coalition structure consists of a minimal winning coalition and its complement.

Coalitional Games and Contracts Based on Individual Deviations

We study what coalitions form and how the members of each coalition split the coalition value in coalitional games in which only individual deviations are allowed. In this context we employ three stability notions: individual, contractual, and compensational stability. These notions differ in terms of the underlying contractual assumptions. We characterize the coalitional games in which individually stable outcomes exist by means of the top-partition property. Furthermore, we show that any coalition structure of maximum social worth is both contractually and compensationally stable.

A topological algorithm for identification of structural domains of proteins

Background: Identification of the structural domains of proteins is important for our understanding of the organizational principles and mechanisms of protein folding, and for insights into protein function and evolution. Algorithmic methods of dissecting protein of known structure into domains developed so far are based on an examination of multiple geometrical, physical and topological features. Successful as many of these approaches are, they employ a lot of heuristics, and it is not clear whether they illuminate any deep underlying principles of protein domain organization. Other well-performing domain dissection methods rely on comparative sequence analysis. These methods are applicable to sequences with known and unknown structure alike, and their success highlights a fundamental principle of protein modularity, but this does not directly improve our understanding of protein spatial structure.

Labor unions and Nash bargaining using coalition formation games

In this paper we examine the properties of stable coalitions under sequential and simultaneous bargaining by competing labor unions. We do this using the Nash bargaining solution and various notions of stability, namely, Nash, coalitional, contractual and core stability. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved,

Topological mappings between graphs, trees and generalized trees

We present novel topological mappings between graphs, trees and generalized trees that means between structured objects with different properties. The two major contributions of this paper are, first, to clarify the relation between graphs, trees and generalized trees, a graph class recently introduced. Second, these transformations provide a unique opportunity to transform structured objects into a representation that might be beneficial for a processing, e.g., by machine learning techniques for graph classification. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.