Ulysses contracts in medicine

Ulysses contracts are a method by which one person binds himself by agreeing to be bound by others. In medicine such contracts have primarily been discussed as ways of treating people with episodic mental illnesses, where the features of the illness are such that they now judge that they will refuse treatment at the time it is needed. Enforcing Ulysses contracts in these circumstances would require medical professionals to override the express refusal of the patient at the time treatment is required, something that is generally problematic both ethically and legally. In this paper I will argue that despite appearances Ulysses contracts can make it the case that treating a patient in such circumstances is an instance of treating him with his consent, although safeguards are needed to ensure that this is the case. Given the potential benefits to patients I further argue that modified Ulysses contracts should be made legally enforceable.

'It Is Not as Easy as ABC': Examining Practitioners' Views on Using Behavioural Contracts to Encourage Young People to Accept Responsibility for their Anti-Social Behaviour

This article examines the use of acceptable behavioural contracts as a tool for engendering the voluntary acceptance of responsibility in children and young people perceived to be engaging in anti-social behaviour and low-level criminality. Based on the results of a qualitative empirical analysis with local government and social housing anti-social behaviour teams, the article explores the attitudes of practitioners to the use of this unregulated but commonly utilised intervention. Practitioners' views are contrasted with the ideals of voluntary responsibilisation upon which the contracts are supposedly based. It is argued that there is a spectrum of differing approaches among practitioners, with some using the contracts more to encourage the voluntary acceptance of responsibility, whilst others use them more coercively to hold individuals responsible for their behaviour. The implications of these differing approaches are examined.

Contracts for the Sale of Land: Understanding the Impecuniosity Defence

Where either the seller or buyer of landed property fails to complete a contract to sell land the non-breaching party has a right to seek specific performance of the contract. This remedy would compel the party in default to perform the contract on pain of being held in contempt of court if the court's order is not obeyed. The defaulting party would not be able to satisfy its obligations under the law by paying a sum of money as damages for breach of contract. This paper considers the impecuniosity defence to specific performance as recognised by courts in Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, Australia and New Zealand. Where the buyer demonstrates that he or she simply cannot raise the funds to buy the property specific performance will not be decreed and the court will make an award of damages for breach of contract measured by the difference between the contract price and the market price of the property at the time of default. The paper considers the nature and parameters of this defence and how it differs (if at all) from the alternative defence of extreme hardship. The paper addresses the question of whether it might be better to move to a position where sellers of land in all cases no longer enjoy a presumption of specific performance but have to demonstrate that the alternative remedy of damages is clearly inadequate. If this should be so the paper goes on to consider whether abolition of the presumption in favour of specific performance for sellers should lead to abolition of the presumption of specific performance for buyers, as is the position in Canada following the Supreme Court's decision in Semelhago v Paramadevan [1996] 2 SCR 415.