Macroprudential Ideas and Contested Social Purpose: A Response to Terrence Casey

In response to Terrence Casey's argument that the emergence of macroprudential regulation since the financial crash can and should save neoliberalism we raise five objections. 1). The Debt-Driven Growth Hypothesis (DDG) and the Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH), as Casey terms them, are just as likely to be complementary as they are oppositional and they are by no means incompatible. 2) Casey's empirics are too thin and static, drawn from the 1980s and 1990s, while Anglo Liberal Financialised Capitalism (ALFC) is a complex adaptive system that has continued to evolve throughout the 2000s. 3) Casey overlooks the dynamic relationship between potentially excessive financialisation and the performance of the wider economy, which is becoming a growing concern for many policy makers using the macroprudential frame. 4) Macroprudential as a series of ideas about the economy are often incompatible with neoliberal premises and their ontological foundations. 5) Many of the policy makers who have acted as the biggest champions of macroprudential regulation have also been highly critical of ALFC and view the macroprudential turn as making a contribution to a much needed deeper financial reformation that would over time transform some of the constituent economic and social relations of the existing political economy. We conclude that what we call the social purpose of macroprudential regulation (the question of whether it is intended to patch up or transform the existing system) is contested, and that macroprudential regulation has much potential beyond saving ‘neoliberalism’.

Economic Ideas and the Political Construction of the Financial Crash of 2008

This article is a short introduction to a special section on economic ideas and the political construction of the financial crash. It begins by explaining why economic ideas and the politics of appeals to certain ideas are so integral to the historical significance of the crash of 2008 and the question of whether it can be considered a crash at all. The first section covers the literature on ideas and economic crisis. The second section highlights that the contribution of the special section is to engage in a stock taking exercise of the empirical and conceptual patterns concerning the politics of ideational change underway in the areas of: comparative fiscal policy; monetary policy and Euro zone debt management; capital controls; and financial and securities market regulation and standard setting. The final section outlines the structure of this special section and content of the individual articles.