What’s information got to do with it? Third-party voting in plurality systems

Although strategic voting theory predicts that the number of parties will not exceed two in single-member district plurality systems, the observed number of parties often does. Previous research suggests that the reason why people vote for third parties is that they possess inaccurate information about the parties’ relative chances of winning. However, research has yet to determine whether third-party voting persists under conditions of accurate information. In this article, we examine whether possessing accurate information prevents individuals from voting for third-placed parties in the 2005 and 2010 British elections. We find that possessing accurate information does not prevent most individuals from voting for third-placed parties and that many voters possess reasonably accurate information regarding the viability of the parties in their constituencies. These findings suggest that arguments emphasizing levels of voter information as a major explanation for why multiparty systems often emerge in plurality systems are exaggerated.

Double-breasting voice systems: an assessment of motives, arrangements and durability

This article explores employee voice within the specific institutional arrangement of double-breasting. Double-breasting is when multi-plant organizations recognize trade unions in some company sites, with non-union arrangements at other company plants, or where a unionized firm acquires a new site that it then operates on a non-union basis. We examine three research questions in four separate case study organizations that operate employee voice double-breasting arrangements across 16 workplace locations on the island of Ireland. These questions consider employer motives for double-breasting, the practices that characterize double-breasting employee voice, and the micro-political implications of double-breasting. The article contributes to knowledge on the emergence and impact of double-breasting and employee voice systems. We subsequently advance two theoretical propositions: the first theorizing employer motives for double-breasting, and the second explaining the extent to which the practice of double-breasting is durable over time.

Electoral Systems, Ethnic Cleavages, and Experience with Democracy

Recent studies show the effects of electoral systems and ethnic cleavages on the number of parties in emerging democracies differ from those effects observed in more established democracies. Building on recent arguments maintaining the quality of democracy improves with experience, we argue the reason for the differences in the findings between established and emerging democracies is that the effects of these variables on the number of parties differ according to a country’s experience with elections. To test this argument, we analyse party system fragmentation in 89 established and emerging democracies and the conditioning effects experience with elections have on the effects of district magnitude, ethnic cleavages, and variables relating to the presidential party system. The results show the effects of institutional and social cleavage variables differ substantially between emerging and established democracies, but these effects begin to approximate those seen in more established democracies with additional experience with elections.

Estimating policy positions from political texts

<p>The analysis of policy-based party;;competition will not make serious progress beyond the constraints of (a) the unitary actor assumption and (b) a static approach to analyzing party competition between elections until a method is available for deriving; reliable and valid time-series estimates of the policy positions of large numbers of political actors. Retrospective estimation of these positions;In past party systems will require a method for estimating policy positions from political texts.</p><p>Previous hand-coding content analysis schemes deal with policy emphasis rather than policy positions. We propose a new hand-coding scheme for policy positions, together with a new English language computer,coding scheme that is compatible with this. We apply both schemes; to party manifestos from Britain and Ireland in 1992 and 1997 and cross validate the resulting estimates with :those derived from quite independent expert surveys and with previous,manifesto analyses.</p><p>There is a high degree of cross validation between coding methods. including computer coding. This implies that it is indeed possible to use computer-coded content analysis to derive reliable and valid estimates of policy positions from political texts. This will allow vast Volumes of text to be coded, including texts generated by individuals and other internal party actors, allowing the empirical elaboration of dynamic rather than static models of party competition that move beyond the unitary actor assumption.</p>

Resolving conflict in bipolar societies: The fate of political settlements in Fiji and Northern Ireland

Ethnically divided societies that might be described as ‘balanced bicommunal’ (where there are two communities, each of which comes close to representing half of the population) pose a particular challenge to conventional principles of collective decision-making, and commonly threaten political stability. This article analyses the experience of two such societies – Northern Ireland and Fiji – with a view to exploring whether there are common processes in the route by which political stability has been pursued. We assess the manner in which a distinctive relationship with Great Britain and its political culture has interacted with local conditions to produce a highly competitive, bipolar party system. This leads to consideration of the devices that have been adopted in an effort to bridge the gap between the communities: the Fiji constitution as amended in 1997, and Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement of 1998. We focus, in particular, on the use of unusual (preferential voting) formulas for the election of parliamentarians and of an inclusive principle in the selection of ministers, and consider the contribution of these institutional devices to the attainment of political stability. We find that, in both cases, the intervention of forces from outside the political system had a decisive impact, though in very different ways. In addition to being underpinned by solid institutional design, for political settlements to work effectively, some minimal level of trust between rival elites is required.