Placing political economy: organising opposition to free trade before the abolition of the Corn Laws

The unfurling of global capitalism – and its attendant effects – has long been fertile intellectual terrain for geographers. But whilst studies of the processes and mechanisms of globalisation undoubtedly assume a talismanic importance in the discipline, geographers, with few exceptions, have left examinations of early economic liberalism to historians. One such critically important episode in the evolution of the liberal economic project was the repeal of the so-called 'Corn Laws' in 1846. Whilst the precise impact of the Manchester-based Anti-Corn Law League (ACLL) continues to be a matter of conjecture, Eric Sheppard has asserted that their particular take on political economy managed to assume a 'truth-like status' and worldwide universality. But the ACLL's campaign represents only one, albeit decisive, stage in the long intellectual and practical struggle between 'protectionists' and the disciples of free trade. Studies of the non-'Manchester' components have tended to focus squarely upon national politics. This paper examines a pivotal attempt in 1838 by Lord Melbourne's Government to experiment with the effective elimination of import duties on fresh fruit. Unlike most agricultural commodities, table fruit was produced in a tightly defined area, thus allowing the Government's experiment to play out, in theory, without national political fallout. Whilst the Government's clandestine actions left little time for a concerted opposition to develop, Kentish fruit growers soon organised. A formidable lobby was forged that drew wide local support yet also evolved beyond the original 'epistemic community'. Whilst the coalition failed in their efforts to reintroduce protective duties, their actions allow us to see how protectionist ideologies and policies were vivified through practices at many different spatial scales and to better understand the complex spatiality of protectionist takes on political economy. Their campaign also changed – at least in the short term – the course of British mercantile policy.

The maximal C*-algebra of quotients as an operator bimodule

We establish a description of the maximal C*-algebra of quotients of a unital C*-algebra A as a direct limit of spaces of completely bounded bimodule homomorphisms from certain operator submodules of the Haagerup tensor product of A with itself labelled by the essential closed right ideals of A into A. In addition the invariance of the construction of the maximal C*-algebra of quotients under strong Morita equivalence is proved.

Maximal C*-algebras of quotients and injective envelopes of C*-algebras

A new C*-enlargement of a C*-algebra A nested between the local multiplier algebra of A and its injective envelope is introduced. Various aspects of this maximal C*-algebra of quotients are studied, notably in the setting of AW*-algebras. As a by-product we obtain a new example of a type I C*-algebra such that its second iterated local multiplier algebra is strictly larger than its local multiplier algebra.

On maximal subgroups of the multiplicative group of a division algebra

This note studies the question whether a multiplicative group of a division ring has a maximal subgroup. It is published in J. Algebra. This is a reputable journal in the subject algebra. Most of submitted papers from 5* schools in RAE was in this journal.

Nonmarket Capabilities and the Prosecution of Trade Remedy Cases in the United States

The study investigates the prosecution of US trade remedy cases as examples of administrative government agency investigations and seeks to identify key capabilities for effective corporate political strategy targeting these institutions. Trade remedy cases are important policy tools, designed to protect domestic firms from ‘unfair’ import competition. The research contributes to the growing literature on corporate political activity and its links with superior outcomes in the marketplace. Three capabilities are identified: the capability to collect market/non-market intelligence, the capability to build and shape the administrative record, and the capability to align business practice with the US trade remedy institutions.

Solving exchange rate puzzles with neither sticky prices nor trade costs

We present a simple framework in which both the exchange rate disconnect and forward bias puzzles are simultaneously resolved. The flexible-price two-country monetary model is extended to include a consumption externality with habit persistence. Habitpersistence is modeled using Campbell Cochrane preferences with ‘deep’ habits along the lines of the work of Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe. By deep habits, we mean habits defined over goods rather than countries. The model is simulated using the artificial economy methodology. It offers a neo-classical explanation of the Meese–Rogoff puzzle and mimics the failure of fundamentals to explain nominal exchange rates in a linear setting. Finally, the model naturally generates the negative slope in the standard forward market regression.