Professional Negligence, Solicitors: Recent Case Law, 2014

In preparation for this talk I have reviewed cases of interest in the High Courts and Courts of Appeal of England and Wales and Northern Ireland from the past two years or so on professional negligence and liability and principally relating to solicitors.

There are six topics of interest: the general duty of care demanded of solicitors in the carrying out of their professional obligations; whether there is a specific duty on a solicitor to warn or advise a client of any implied risk in, say, a commercial transaction; what is the scope of the duty on a solicitor to explain the content of or clauses in a legal document; a recent case of interest applying the White v Jones principle to a disappointed beneficiary seeking to make a claim against a solicitor who negligently prepared a will; the practical, limitation issue of how to pinpoint in a professional negligence claim when the damage was first sustained by the claimant; and finally some case law here and in England and Wales on the (costs) implications for solicitors relating to any failure to adhere to case management protocols or related court directions.

European Union non-discrimination law and intersectionality:Investigating the triangle of racial, gender and disability discrimination

This book contributes to a critical reflection of current legislative and jurisprudential developments in Non-Discrimination Law, focusing on the European Union. The book is focused on intersectionality between gender, race and disability and the question of whether, and to what extent, this intersection can be adequately addressed in (EU) law. The discussion rests on two basic assumptions. First, the multiplication of 'discrimination grounds' in EU law and other legal regimes should not result in a dilution of the demands of equality law. Accordingly, the book focuses on the three key grounds - race, gender and disability. These constitute nodes around which other discrimination grounds can be grouped. Second, any multi-ground non-discrimination law framework needs to engage with the question of discrimination on several grounds. This book provides a critical evaluation of some of the problems presented by such intersectionality and an opportunity to explore the issues in depth. This collection offers some new proposals relating to the regrouping of identity categories and to the general approach to socio-legal research in the field. It also contains a comparative section, which expands on practical experiences with intersectionality and law, and a section dedicated to juridical responses to intersectionality.

The Dark Side of Nudging: The Ethics, Political Economy, and Law of Libertarian Paternalism

Libertarian paternalism, as advanced by Cass Sunstein, is seriously flawed, but not primarily for the reasons that most commentators suggest. Libertarian paternalism and its attendant regulatory implications are too libertarian, not too paternalistic, and as a result are in considerable tension with ‘thick’ conceptions of human dignity. We make four arguments. The first is that there is no justification for a presumption in favor of nudging as a default regulatory strategy, as Sunstein asserts. It is ordinarily less effective than mandates; such mandates rarely offend personal autonomy; and the central reliance on cognitive failures in the nudging program is more likely to offend human dignity than the mandates it seeks to replace. Secondly, we argue that nudging as a regulatory strategy fits both overtly and covertly, often insidiously, into a more general libertarian program of political economy. Thirdly, while we are on the whole more concerned to reject the libertarian than the paternalistic elements of this philosophy, Sunstein’s work, both in Why Nudge?, and earlier, fails to appreciate how nudging may be manipulative if not designed with more care than he acknowledges. Lastly, because of these characteristics, nudging might even be subject to legal challenges that would give us the worst of all possible regulatory worlds: a weak regulatory intervention that is liable to be challenged in the courts by well-resourced interest groups. In such a scenario, and contrary to the ‘common sense’ ethos contended for in Why Nudge?, nudges might not even clear the excessively low bar of doing something rather than nothing. Those seeking to pursue progressive politics, under law, should reject nudging in favor of regulation that is more congruent with principles of legality, more transparent, more effective, more democratic, and allows us more fully to act as moral agents. Such a system may have a place for (some) nudging, but not one that departs significantly from how labeling, warnings and the like already function, and nothing that compares with Sunstein’s apparent ambitions for his new movement.

The New Architecture of EU Equality Law after CHEZ: Did the Court of Justice reconceptualise direct and indirect discrimination?

The Court of Justice’s decision of the 16 July 2015, in Case C-83/14 CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria AD v Komisia za zashtita ot diskriminatsia, is a critically important case for two main reasons. First, it represents a further step along the path of addressing ethnic discrimination against Roma communities in Europe, particularly in Bulgaria, where the case arises. Second, it provides interpretations (sometimes controversial interpretations) of core concepts in the EU antidiscrimination Directives that will be drawn on in the application of equality law well beyond Bulgaria, and well beyond the pressing problem of ethnic discrimination against Roma. This article focuses particularly on the second issue, the potentially broader implications of the case. In particular, it will ask whether the Court of Justice’s approach in CHEZ is subtly redrawing the boundaries of EU equality law in general, in particular by expanding the concept of direct discrimination, or whether the result and the approach adopted is sui generis, one depending on the particular context of the case and the fact that it involves allegations of discrimination against Roma, and therefore of limited general application.