The Creative Life of Law: Improvisation, Between Tradition and Suspicion

Originally applying solely to chefs, waiters, dishwashers and the like, New York City (NYC) regulations governing cabaret employees were altered in 1943 to include musicians and entertainers, who until the late 1960’s would be required to hold a NYC Cabaret Employee’s Identification Card. The introduction of these notorious “police cards” occurred roughly contemporaneously to the emergence in after-hours night clubs in Harlem of a new and supposedly “wild”, improvisatory brand of jazz: bebop. This article adds to the many rather practical theories on why these cards were introduced a more abstract discussion coined in terms of the relationship between suspicion and tradition and focusing on differing essences of law and improvisatory jazz. While law breathes tradition and is suspicious of improvisation and unpredictability, the converse is true of jazz. Allusion to tradition in jazz improvisation is often viewed as a betrayal of its creative and spontaneous nature. And yet it is only through its departure from the stable transmission of past meaning that improvisation gains meaning. Law, in contrast, while appearing to be entirely composed of tradition, to transmit some sort of determinate and fixed meaning, is constantly betraying itself. As no two legal actions can be exactly the same, judges must improvise on tradition and past precedent every time they are asked to decide a case. Law can thus neither dispense with nor be completely determined by tradition. The legal decision instead lies on the border between what it “is” and what it otherwise could be and every judicial act is, in some sense, a species of improvisation. This article uses the cabaret cards to explore this uncertain terrain between law and improvisation, between tradition and suspicion.

Re-engineering Sources of Law for Unaided Litigants

The better models of e-Gov posit high levels of informational communication between citizen and state. Unfortunately, in one area, that communication has traditionally been poor: that is, access to sources of law. There have been a number of reasons for this, but a primary one has been that law was historically mediated for the citizen by the legal profession. This situation is changing with ever increasing numbers of unrepresented litigants being involved at all levels of national court systems in each and every country as well as a generally higher level of intrusion of legislation into everyday home and business life. There have been attempts to improve access through internet based services, but these have improved communication (‘understanding of law’) to only a limited extent. It may be time, this article suggests, to consider re-engineering legal sources so that they better fit the needs of eGov.

'Rule of Law and Politics of Anti-Corruption Campaigns in a Post-Authoritarian State- The Nigerian Case'

This article evaluates the anti-corruption campaign instituted in Nigeria following on the post-authoritarian transition in the country, with specific focus on political corruption. The anti-corruption campaign is being prosecuted within a context where law is as critical a factor as politics. This article examines whether the judiciary, in view of its accountability deficit, can offer legitimacy to the campaign. How has its questionable credentials impacted on its involvement in the campaign to sanitise public life? What has been the impact of the judicial role on the rule of law? These are some of the important questions this article seeks to answer. The inquiry in this article demonstrates how the guardian institution of the rule of law faces an uphill task in the performance of that role in a post-authoritarian context.

"A Note of Caution about the Role of Law in Controlling the Administration in the United Kingdom"

"A Note of Caution about the Role of Law in Controlling the Administration in the United Kingdom"

The problem with law in books and law in computers - the oral nature of law

It is becoming clear that, contrary to earlier expectations, the application of AI techniques to law is not as easy nor as effective as some claimed. Unfortunately, for most AI researchers, there seems to be little understanding of just why this is. In this paper I argue, from empirical study of lawyers in action, just why there is a mismatch between the AI view of law, and law in practice. While this is important and novel, it also - if my arguments are accepted - demonstrates just why AI will never have success in producing the computerised lawyer.