A low molecular weight hydro and organogelator derived from an isohexide and sol-gel transcription of the alcogel

Heating 2,5-di-O-methanesulfonyl-1,4:3,6-dianhydro-D-sorbitol (1) in a range of solvents led to the formation of a gel state at low concentrations. 1 was found to gel aromatics, alcohols and water. The structure of 1 in the solid state was solved by single crystal X-ray crystallography; no strong hydrogen bonds or associated solvents were found in the crystal. Electron micrographs revealed the morphology of the gels to be predominantly rod-like. The ethanol alcogel was used to template silica by sol-gel transcription.

Restraing Regulatory Capture? Anglo America, Crisis Politics and Trajectories of Change in Global Financial Governance

A growing number of respected commentators now argue that regulatory capture of public agencies and public policy by leading banks was one of the main causal factors behind the financial crisis of 2007–2009, resulting in a permissive regulatory environment. This regulatory environment placed a faith in banks own internal risk models, contributed to pro-cyclical behaviour and turned a blind eye to excessive risk taking. The article argues that a form of ‘multi-level regulatory capture’ characterized the global financial architecture prior to the crisis. Simultaneously, regulatory capture fed off, but also nourished the financial boom, in a fashion that mirrored the life cycle of the boom itself. Minimizing future financial booms and crises will require continuous, conscious and explicit efforts to restrain financial regulatory capture now and into the future. The article assesses the extent to which this has been achieved in current global financial governance reform efforts and highlights some of the persistent difficulties that will continue to hamper efforts to restrain regulatory capture. The evidence concerning the extent to which regulatory capture is being effectively restrained is somewhat mixed, and where it is happening it is largely unintentional and accidental. Recent reforms have overlooked the political causes of the crisis and have failed to focus explicitly or systematically on regulatory capture.