Managing for Legitimacy: Agency Governance in its “Deep” Constitutional Context

Recent literature on bureaucratic structure has gone further than studying discretions given to bureaucrats in policy making, and much attention is now paid to understanding how bureaucratic agencies are managed. This article proposes that the way in which executive governments manage their agencies varies according to their constitutional setting and that this relationship is driven by considerations of the executive’s governing legitimacy. Inspired by Tilly (1984), we compare patterns of agency governance in Hong Kong and Ireland, in particular configurations of assigned decision-making autonomies and control mechanisms. This comparison shows that in governing their agencies the elected government of Ireland’s parliamentary democracy pays more attention to input (i.e. democratic) legitimacy while the executive government of Hong Kong’s administrative state favors output (i.e. performance) legitimacy. These different forms of autonomy and control mechanism reflect different constitutional models of how political executives acquire and sustain their governing legitimacy.

Producing and Governing Community (Through) Resilience

This article argues that the UK government’s Community Resilience programme is less about responding to disasters and more a matter of producing community and governing its behaviour. The passing over of responsibility to local volunteers and organisations is not only about empowerment, but forming identities and relationships that can be more efficiently managed and directed. However, this attempt is hamstrung by its basis in a nostalgic, romantic view of community and the effacement of poverty and inequality as central to the vulnerability/resilience binary. The effect may be a more intense government of communities rather than their empowerment through resilience.