Costs, outputs and outcomes in school PFI contracts and the significance of project size

This article examines operational Private Finance Initiative (PFI) school projects and reports the experiences of UK headteachers. It considers the impact of project size on value for money (VFM). Headteachers involved in small projects are more satisfied with costs than those involved in large projects, but headteachers involved in larger projects are more satisfied with affordability. Generally, heads are more satisfied with the buildings than with the services. The authors question the government’s recent policy changes to increase the size of PFI projects.

Coalitional Games and Contracts Based on Individual Deviations

We study what coalitions form and how the members of each coalition split the coalition value in coalitional games in which only individual deviations are allowed. In this context we employ three stability notions: individual, contractual, and compensational stability. These notions differ in terms of the underlying contractual assumptions. We characterize the coalitional games in which individually stable outcomes exist by means of the top-partition property. Furthermore, we show that any coalition structure of maximum social worth is both contractually and compensationally stable.