New Organizational Leadership: Nonstate Actors in Global Economic Governance

States and international organizations have found irresistible cause in a globalizing world to coopt nonstate actors (NGOs, private standard setters and so forth) to manage the manifold problems arising under their stretched mandates and resources. The pooling of capacities in the pursuit of common goals seems perfectly sensible. Yet although the strategy of cooptation has become a policy of choice, policy makers often lack full knowledge of its implications. As Philip Selznick first showed, cooptation can have unintended consequences, shifting leadership from one organization to another. We place this fertile insight in a better specified analytical framework. That is, one capable of explaining when and how leadership shifts occur and where the status quo leaders will remain at the helm. Using original interview data and structured focused comparisons to test the framework, we reveal dramatic variation in leadership changes following the cooptation of outside actors in global financial and environmental governance.

'Trusting the numbers': mineral prospecting, raising finance and the governance of knowledge

Mineral prospecting and raising finance for ‘junior’ mining firms has historically been regarded as a speculative activity. For the regulators of securities markets upon which ‘junior’ mining companies seek to raise capital, a perennial problem has been handling not only the indeterminacy of scientific claims, but also the social basis of epistemic practices. This paper examines the production of a system of public warrant and associated knowledge practices intended to enable investors to differentiate between ‘destructive’ and ‘productive’ varieties of financial speculation. It traces the use of the notion of ‘disclosure’ in constructing and legitimizing the ‘juniors’ market in Canada. It argues that though the work of ‘economics’ may be necessary in the construction of markets, it is by no means sufficient. Attention must also be given to the ways in which legal models of ‘the free-market’ can be translated and constantly re-worked across the sites and spaces of regulatory practice, animating the geographies of markets.

Accountability for Responsibility: An assessment of the Transnational Capitalist Class' role in driving a Global CSR Agenda

Globalisation has led to the establishment of a new hierarchy of leadership. At the helm is the Transnational Capitalist Class (TCC) , which oversees the direction of Multi National Corporations (MNCs) at a global level. Can the TCC, as leaders in the governance agenda, drive a global CSR agenda, or, perhaps, the question should be: do they want to drive a CSR agenda?
The hypothesis of this article is that, as the structure of global leadership and governance has changed, so too has the potential for aligning national CSR agendas to a globally accepted standard. This is unlikely due to systematic limitations inherent in a transitional structural realignment of global leadership. Whereas the design of global leadership has changed due to processes of globalization, the bodies that can regulate this leadership have not developed at the same pace. Regulation on issues such as CSR remains at national, federal and supra-­-national levels suggesting that TCCs have a free reign in dictating agenda. This new class (TCC) may bear a responsibility for CSR but there is a lack of accountability if it is not fulfilled.

Reforming the Westminster Model of Agency Governance: Britain and Ireland after the Crisis

Conventional understandings of what the Westminster model implies anticipate reliance on a top-down, hierarchical approach to budgetary accountability, reinforced by a post–New Public Management emphasis on recentralizing administrative capacity. This article, based on a comparative analysis of the experiences of Britain and Ireland, argues that the Westminster model of bureaucratic control and oversight itself has been evolving, hastened in large part due to the global financial crisis. Governments have gained stronger controls over the structures and practices of agencies, but agencies are also key players in securing better governance outcomes. The implication is that the crisis has not seen a return to the archetypal command-and-control model, nor a wholly new implementation of negotiated European-type practices, but rather a new accountability balance between elements of the Westminster system itself that have not previously been well understood.