38 resultados para Deposit banking
Resumo:
Aspidochirote holothurians found on tropical reef flats feed on particulate deposits which form a variety of substrata. The synaptid holothurian Opheodesoma grisea (Semper) feeds in a similar manner by scraping deposits from the surfaces of sea grasses. Distributional and gut content analyses showed that species partitioning is on the basis of substratum and particle size preference. Scanning electron microscopy revealed that the tentacles of aspidochirotes have a nodular surface while those of O. grisea have a tessellated surface structure. The twelve different species examined were shown to have different tentacular surface textures which bore an apparent relationship with the mean particle sizes selected by the different species. Light microscope studies of tentacle sections confirmed earlier observations on the extent of the water vascular system in aspidochirote and pinnate tentacles. From these observations a functional interpretation is proposed for tentacular operation and the means of particle selection in such holothurians.
Resumo:
The purpose of this paper is to examine IT adoption by Irish credit unions. Using probabilistic models, we explore one aspect of IT, that of internet banking technology, and assess the degree to which characteristics specific to the credit union and to its potential membership base influence adoption. Our
analysis suggests that asset size, organisational structure being a member of the Irish League of Credit Unions and the loan to asset ratio are all important credit union specific drivers of internet banking adoption. We also find that characteristics of the area from where the credit union captures its members are important. Factors such as the percentage of the population that is employed, the proportion of the population in the age bracket 35 to 44, the proportion of the population that have access to broadband and the level of familiarity with a local ATM facility are all identified as influencing the probability of adopting internet banking.
Resumo:
Can the lessons of the past help us to prevent another banking collapse in the future? This is the first book to tell the story of the rise and fall of British banking stability in the past two centuries, and it sheds new light on why banking systems crash and the factors underpinning banking stability. John Turner shows that there were only two major banking crises in Britain during this time: the crisis of 1825–6 and the Great Crash of 2007–8. Although there were episodic bouts of instability in the interim, the banking system was crisis-free. Why was the British banking system stable for such a long time and why did the British banking system implode in 2008? In answering these questions, the book explores the long-run evolution of bank regulation, the role of the Bank of England, bank rescues and the need to hold shareholders to account.
Resumo:
In contrast to most empirical investigations of the efficiency of multiproduct financial institutions, which either estimate scale and scope economies with a given state of technology, or only analyse technical change in the presence of overall scale economies, this study estimates overall scale economies, product-specific scale economies and scope economies in the presence of both neutral and non-neutral technical change. Also, in contrast to most other empirical studies in this area, standard errors are computed for all relevant statistics. The findings indicate diseconomies of scope; overall diseconomies of scale; product-specific economies are decreasing for investments and increasing for loans; in addition to substantial neutral technical change, biased technical change is labour- and capital-saving and deposits-using in character.
Resumo:
Why did imitations of Raiffeisen’s rural cooperative savings and loans associations work well in some European countries, but fail in others? This article considers the example of Raiffeisenism in Ireland and in the Netherlands. Raiffeisen banks arrived in both places at the same time, but had drastically different fates. In Ireland they were almost wiped out by the early 1920s, while in the Netherlands they proved to be a long-lasting institutional transplant. Raiffeisen banks were successful in the Netherlands because they operated in niche markets with few competitors, while rural financial markets in Ireland were unsegmented and populated by long- established incumbents, leaving little room for new players, whatever their institu- tional advantages. Dutch Raiffeisen banks were largely self-financing, closely integrated into the wider rural economy, and able to take advantage of economic and religious divisions in rural society. Their Irish counterparts were not.
Resumo:
Why did banking compliance fail so badly in the recent financial crisis and why, according to many, does it continue to do so? Rather than point to the lack of oversight of individuals in bank compliance roles, as many commentators do, in this paper I examine in depth the organizational context that surrounded people in such roles. I focus on those compliance personnel who did speak out about risky practices in their banks, who were forced to escalate the problem and 'whistle-blow' to external parties, and who were punished for doing so. Drawing on recent empirical data from a wider study, I argue that the concept of dependence corruption is useful in this setting, and that it can be extended to encompass interpersonal attachments. This, in turn, problematises the concept of dependence corruption because interpersonal attachments in organisational settings are inevitable. The paper engages with recent debates on whether institutional corruption is an appropriate lens for studying private-sector organisations by arguing for a focus on roles, rather than remaining at the level of institutional fields or individual organisations. Finally, the paper contributes to studies on banking compliance in the context of the recent crisis; without a deeper understanding of those who were forced to extremes to simply do their jobs, reform of the banking sector will prove difficult.