Making 'party identification' more versatile: operationalising the concept for the multiparty setting

The conventional operationalisation of the concept of party identification is not appropriate for the multiparty setting. I offer new measures that facilitate multiple, and negative as well as positive, identities. Using survey evidence from Northern Ireland, these new measures are validated in a number of ways and their role in a comprehensive model of voting is illustrated.

Multi-Party Negotiation When Agents Have Subjective Estimates of Bargaining Powers

This paper presents a method for generating Pareto-optimal solutions in multi-party negotiations. In this iterative method, decision makers (DMs) formulate proposals that yield a minimum payoff to their opponents. Each proposal belongs to the efficient frontier, DMs try to adjust to a common one. In this setting, each DM is supposed to have a given bargaining power. More precisely each DM is supposed to have a subjective estimate of the power of the different parties. We study the convergence of the method, and provide examples where there is no possible agreement resulting from it.

Horowitz’s Theory of Ethnic Party Competition and the Case of the SDLP, 1970-79

Donald Horowitz's theory of ethnic conflict suggests that a political party operating in a deeply divided society can be effected by a centrifugal pull even when it is not subject to formal electoral competition. This idea can be applied to Northern Ireland's SDLP in the 1970s, when the party faced no credible electoral rival within its primary political constituency. Doing so helps to explain why the SDLP failed in its original objective of mobilizing a cross-community constituency, and instead became what Horowitz terms an “ethnically based party,” representing the interests of only one side of the political divide in Northern Ireland.