The Effect of the Secret Ballot on Party System Fragmentation: A Test of Three Competing Arguments

Few studies have examined the impact that the adoption of the secret ballot had on party system fragmentation outside the United States. This article tests arguments maintaining that the adoption of the secret ballot had a negative, positive or nil effect on party system fragmentation. Using time-series cross-sectional data from
several countries adopting the secret ballot around the turn of the twentieth century, the results demonstrate that the adoption of the secret ballot did not hinder – though did not favour, either – the development of multiparty systems.

In Defiance of Duverger: The Class Cleavage and the Emergence of District-Level Multiparty Systems in Western Europe

At its core, Duverger’s Law—holding that the number of viable parties in first-past-the-post systems should not exceed two—applies primarily at the district level. While the number of parties nationally may exceed two, district-level party system fragmentation should not. Given that a growing body of research shows that district-level party system fragmentation can indeed exceed two in first-past-the-post systems, I explore whether the major alternative explanation for party system fragmentation—the social cleavage approach—can explain such violations of Duverger’s Law. Testing this argument in several West European elections prior to the adoption of proportional representation, I find evidence favouring a social cleavage explanation: with the expansion of the class cleavage, the average district-level party system eventually came to violate the two-party predictions associated with Duverger’s Law. This suggests that sufficient social cleavage diversity may produce multiparty systems in other first-past-the-post systems.

Electoral Systems, Ethnic Cleavages, and Experience with Democracy

Recent studies show the effects of electoral systems and ethnic cleavages on the number of parties in emerging democracies differ from those effects observed in more established democracies. Building on recent arguments maintaining the quality of democracy improves with experience, we argue the reason for the differences in the findings between established and emerging democracies is that the effects of these variables on the number of parties differ according to a country’s experience with elections. To test this argument, we analyse party system fragmentation in 89 established and emerging democracies and the conditioning effects experience with elections have on the effects of district magnitude, ethnic cleavages, and variables relating to the presidential party system. The results show the effects of institutional and social cleavage variables differ substantially between emerging and established democracies, but these effects begin to approximate those seen in more established democracies with additional experience with elections.