Labor unions and Nash bargaining using coalition formation games

In this paper we examine the properties of stable coalitions under sequential and simultaneous bargaining by competing labor unions. We do this using the Nash bargaining solution and various notions of stability, namely, Nash, coalitional, contractual and core stability. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved,

Nash equilibria of network formation games under consent

We investigate the Nash equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation based on explicit consent in link formation. These so-called “consent models” explicitly take account of link formation costs. We provide characterizations of Nash equilibria of such consent models under both one-sided and two-sided costs of link formation. We relate these equilibrium concepts to link-based stability concepts, in particular strong link deletion proofness.

London 2012 and Climate Change. Examining the potential impact of the current economic crisis in the environmental legacy of the Games

The International Olympic Committee (IOC) declares environmental protection to be the third dimension of the Olympic movement. That, in effect, means that nations wishing to host the Games have to present themselves as reliable practitioners of environmental sustainability (ES) in their applications. The greening of sports mega-events, and the hosting of Olympic Games in particular, is now reasonably well established. Yet evidence from the first decade of environmentally-conscious Olympics points to diverging patterns of achievement in the operationalisation of the IOC’s ‘third pillar’. As is now common knowledge, for example, Sydney 2000 was the first ‘Green Olympics’ in the history of the Games; yet four years later, Athens provided a stark contrast, and was the subject of highly critical assessment reports by environmental organisations. Yet Athens has not stopped the Bid Committee for the Beijing 2008 Games claiming that it would ‘leave the greatest Olympic Games environmental legacy ever’ (UNEP 2007: 26), while the London 2012 promotes the concept of the ‘One Planet Olympics’.

In this context and in light of the current global economic crisis, can we claim that London 2012 has the capacity to fulfil its environmental ambitions? This question is adopted in continuity with similar framed questions that have been posed in relation to the most recent Olympics and it is tackled by adopting an investigative model that is placed within discourses of ‘reflexive modernisation’.

Vision and Virtuality:The Construction of Narrative Space in Film and Computer Games

This paper seeks to explore the construction of narrative space in 3D PC computer games. With reference to Stephen Heath’s theory of filmic narrative space, the paper will examine how computer games, based on the rendition of a continuous 3D, real-time interactive environment, construct a distinct mode of narrativisation. The dynamic imbrication of the manipulation of 3D objects in a virtual world and the (re)presentation of this virtual mise-en-scene constitute an interaction that affects the concept of narrative in computer games. This leads to several questions that the paper seeks to investigate: How does the construction of space in PC games contribute to the meaning-making process or the gamer’s experience of narrative? How then is this experience of narrative game-space different from that of film?

Stressed Web Environments as Strategic Games: Risk Profiles and Weltanschauung

We consider the behaviour of a set of services in a stressed web environment where performance patterns may be difficult to predict. In stressed environments the performances of some providers may degrade while the performances of others, with elastic resources, may improve. The allocation of web-based providers to users (brokering) is modelled by a strategic non-cooperative angel-daemon game with risk profiles. A risk profile specifies a bound on the number of unreliable service providers within an environment without identifying the names of these providers. Risk profiles offer a means of analysing the behaviour of broker agents which allocate service providers to users. A Nash equilibrium is a fixed point of such a game in which no user can locally improve their choice of provider – thus, a Nash equilibrium is a viable solution to the provider/user allocation problem. Angel daemon games provide a means of reasoning about stressed environments and offer the possibility of designing brokers using risk profiles and Nash equilibria.