Challenging the SD benefits attributed to sport Mega-Events hosting

Sport Mega-event hosting faces opposition that is manifested with different intensity during the different phases of the event, from its inception as an idea to its delivery and legacy. Some Social Movements Organisations (SMOs) have acted as indefatigable monitors of the Sustainable Development (SD) dimension of sporting events in general and, in some of the most recent sport mega-events, in particular the Olympics, they have served as important advisors and facilitators. Nevertheless, in many cases we see enthusiastic supporters turning to vehemently challenging whatever positives have been associated with hosting the event. In addition, there is opposition to sport Mega-events in their entirety. That type of opposition tends to employ a holistic prism that manages to identify multiple interconnected negative aspects of hosting a sport mega-event and incorporate them into an anti-systemic discourse. It is important to bear in mind that irrespective of many proclamations to the opposite as far as megas are concerned (projects and/or events), a number of studies have demonstrated that citizen participation and democratic accountability in decision-making have been notoriously absent. After all, the idea of citizen participation in the planning of sport mega-event is essentially the public response to a plan conceived by others. There were, of course, some notable cases of democratic consultation at the early stages of bidding to host a sport mega-event but these more democratic approaches resulted in the failure of the bid (for e.g. Toronto 1996). The knowledge of this by the groups that initiated the hosting idea and the bidding process has led to discouraging in depth public consultation that may fit perfectly to the democratic process but not to the tight schedules of associated projects completion. That produces ‘autocracy against which opposition may arise’ (Hiller, 2000, p. 198). It is this democratic deficit that has led to important instances of social contestation and protest mobilizations by citizen groups as well as the more regular corps of social activists. From a perspective borrowed from the sociology of protest and social movements, sport mega-events hosting can operate as an issue that stimulates protest activities by an existing protest milieu and new actors as well as an important mobilizing resource. In fact, some scholars have also argued that the Olympic Games were an important frame for the transnational activism that was marked by anti-globalization protest in Seattle in 1999 (Cottrell & Nelson, 201; Lenskyj, 2008). In addition, it’s important not to lose sight of other acts dissent that take place in relatively close proximity, about a year before the event when most infrastructural and societal changes brought by hosting the event and impact start to become apparent by the host communities, like the rioting of August 2011 in the London Olympic Boroughs and the 2012 riots of June 2013 in Sao Paulo and other Brazilian cities. This paper starts by outlining the SD claims made in the bidding to host the summer Olympic Games by five prospective hosts (Sydney; Athens; Beijing; London and Rio) proceeds towards examining the opposition and challenges that was manifested in relation to these claims. In Particular it provides an assessment of protest-events over the aforementioned different phases of sport mega-events hosting. A different picture emerges for each of the host nation that is partly explained by local, national and global configuration of protest politics. Whereas the post-event legacy of the first two hosts of the Games can be assessed and that way see the validity of claims made by challengers in the other phases, in the other three cases, the implementation of Olympic Games Impact (OGI) studies offers the tool for discussing the post-event phase for Beijing and London and engage in a speculative exercise for the case of Rio. Judging by available findings, the paper concludes that the SD aspiration made in the bid documents are unlikely to be met and social contestation based on the same issues is likely to increase due to the current global economic crisis and BRICS, like China and Brazil, having entered the process of becoming global economic hegemons.

Rough Waters, Dark Shadows and Cross-Cutting Winds:the impact of European Union enlargement on Turkey’s EU accession negotiations

For a multiplicity of socio-economic, geo-political, strategic and identity-based reasons, Turkey’s progress towards EU membership is often treated as a sui generis case. Yet although Turkey’s accession negotiations with the European Union (EU) are essentially a bilateral – and often stormy – affair, they take place within a wider and dynamic process of enlargement in which not only can the gloomy – sometimes dark – shadows of past and prospective enlargements be clearly detected, but so too can the often chill winds from ongoing, parallel negotiations with other candidates. How the EU negotiates accession and what it expects from candidates has continued to evolve since the EU began drawing up its framework for negotiations with Turkey ten years ago. This paper charts this evolution by first identifying changes in the light of Croatia’s negotiating experience, the ‘lessons learnt’ by the EU in meeting the challenges of Bulgarian and Romanian accession, the EU’s handling of Iceland’s membership bid and accession negotiations, and the revised approach to negotiating accession evident in the more recent frameworks for accession negotiations with Montenegro and Serbia. The paper then explores the extent to which these changes have impacted on the approach the EU has adopted in framing and progressing accession negotiations with Turkey. In doing so, it questions both the consistency with which the EU’s negotiates accession and the extent to which Turkey’s progress towards EU membership is conditioned by the broader dynamics of EU enlargement as opposed to simply the dynamics within EU-Turkey relations and domestic Turkish reform efforts.

One-Year Safety of Olodaterol Once Daily via Respimat® in Patients with GOLD 2-4 Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease: Results of a Pre-Specified Pooled Analysis

The novel long-acting β2-agonist olodaterol demonstrated an acceptable safety profile in short-term phase II clinical studies. This analysis of four randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled, parallel-group, phase III studies (1222.11, NCT00782210; 1222.12, NCT00782509; 1222.13, NCT00793624; 1222.14, NCT00796653) evaluated the long-term safety of olodaterol once daily (QD) in a large cohort of patients with moderate to very severe (Global initiative for chronic Obstructive Lung Disease 2-4) chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). The studies compared olodaterol (5 or 10 μg) QD via Respimat®, formoterol 12 μg twice daily (BID) via Aerolizer® (1222.13 and 1222.14), and placebo for 48 weeks. Patients continued receiving background maintenance therapy, with ∼60% receiving concomitant cardiovascular therapy and 25% having a history of concomitant cardiac disease. Pre-specified analyses of pooled data assessed the adverse events (AEs) and serious AEs in the whole population, and in subgroups with cardiac disease, along with in-depth electrocardiogram and Holter monitoring. In total, 3104 patients were included in the safety analysis: 876 received olodaterol 5 μg, 883 received olodaterol 10 μg, 885 received placebos, and 460 received formoterol 12 μg BID. Overall incidence of on-treatment AEs (71.2%), serious AEs (16.1%), and deaths (1.7%) were balanced across treatment groups. Respiratory and cardiovascular AEs, including major adverse cardiac events, were reported at similar frequencies in placebo and active treatment groups. The safety profiles of both olodaterol 5 μg (marketed and registered dose) and 10 μg QD delivered via Respimat® are comparable to placebo and formoterol BID in this population, with no safety signals identified.

Testing preference formation in learning design contingent valuation (LDCV) using advanced information and repetitive treatments

Policymakers have largely replaced Single Bounded Discrete Choice (SBDC) valuation by the more statistically efficient repetitive methods; Double Bounded Discrete Choice (DBDC) and Discrete Choice Experiments (DCE) . Repetitive valuation permits classification into rational preferences: (i) a priori well-formed; (ii) consistent non-arbitrary values “discovered” through repetition and experience; (Plott, 1996; List 2003) and irrational preferences; (iii) consistent but arbitrary values as “shaped” by preceding bid level (Tufano, 2010; Ariely et al., 2003) and (iv) inconsistent and arbitrary values. Policy valuations should demonstrate behaviorally rational preferences. We outline novel methods for testing this in DBDC applied to renewable energy premiums in Chile.