Background beliefs and evidence interpretation

In this paper we argue that it is often adaptive to use one’s background beliefs when interpreting information that, from a normative point of view, is incomplete. In both of the experiments reported here participants were presented with an item possessing two features and were asked to judge, in the light of some evidence concerning the features, to which of two categories it was more likely that the item belonged. It was found that when participants received evidence relevant to just one of these hypothesised categories (i.e. evidence that did not form a Bayesian likelihood ratio) they used their background beliefs to interpret this information. In Experiment 2, on the other hand, participants behaved in a broadly Bayesian manner when the evidence they received constituted a completed likelihood ratio. We discuss the circumstances under which participants, when making their judgements, consider the alternative hypothesis. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our results for an understanding of hypothesis testing, belief revision, and categorisation.

Philosophy, Social Hope and Democratic Criticism:Critical Theory for a Global Age

The attempt to connect philosophy and social hope has been one of the key distinguishing features of critical theory as a tradition of enquiry. This connection has been questioned forcefully from the perspective of a post-philosophical pragmatism, as articulated by Rorty. In this article I consider two strategies that have been adopted by critical theorists in seeking to reject Rorty's suggestion that we should abandon the attempt to ground social hope in philosophical reason. We consider argumentative strategies of the philosophical anthropologist and of the rational proceduralist. Once the exchanges between Rorty and these two strands of critical theory have been reconstructed and assessed, an alternative perspective emerges. It is argued that philosophical reasoning best helps to sustain social hope in a rapidly changing world when we consider it in terms of the practice of democratic criticism.

Stylistics, criticism and mythrepresentation again: squaring the circle with Ray Mackay's subjective solution for all problems

This article is a response to an article by Ray Mackay (1996) which constitutes an attack on stylistic analysis in general, and the writings of the above authors and Ron Carter in particular. Mackay's article (in Language and Communication) accuses stylistics of 'scientificness' and claims that its attempt to provide objective analyses of literary texts is futile.1 We suggest that Mackay has misrepresented what stylisticians have said about objectivity, and that his understanding of objectivity, science and the nature of text-interpretative argument is seriously flawed.