A bargaining set for monotonic simple games based on external and internal stability

A new bargaining set based on notions of both internal and external stability is developed in the context of endogenous coalition formation. It allows to make an explicit distinction between within-group and outside-group deviation options. This type of distinction is not present in current bargaining sets. For the class of monotonic proper simple games, the outcomes in the bargaining set are characterized. Furthermore, it is shown that the bargaining set of any homogeneous weighted majority game contains an outcome for which the underlying coalition structure consists of a minimal winning coalition and its complement.

Coalitional Games and Contracts Based on Individual Deviations

We study what coalitions form and how the members of each coalition split the coalition value in coalitional games in which only individual deviations are allowed. In this context we employ three stability notions: individual, contractual, and compensational stability. These notions differ in terms of the underlying contractual assumptions. We characterize the coalitional games in which individually stable outcomes exist by means of the top-partition property. Furthermore, we show that any coalition structure of maximum social worth is both contractually and compensationally stable.

Synthesis of nucleoside analogues in a ball mill: fast, chemoselective and high yielding acylation without undesirable solvents

The chemoselective acylation of primary aliphatic amines has been achieved in under ten minutes (and for aromatic amines under 120 min) using vibration ball-milling, avoiding undesirable solvents which are typically employed for such reactions (e.g. DMF). Under optimised conditions, the synthesis of amides in the presence of both primary and secondary alcohol functions was achieved in high to excellent yields (65-94%). Overall, the methods described have significant practical advantages over conventional approaches based upon bulk solvents including greater yields, higher chemoselectivity and easier product separation.

Labor unions and Nash bargaining using coalition formation games

In this paper we examine the properties of stable coalitions under sequential and simultaneous bargaining by competing labor unions. We do this using the Nash bargaining solution and various notions of stability, namely, Nash, coalitional, contractual and core stability. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved,

Rapid synthesis of nucleotide pyrophosphate linkages in a ball mill

Using a ball mill, rapid, atom-economic coupling between adenosine-5'-phosphoromorpholidate and phosphorylated ribose derivatives as their sodium or barium salts was achieved. Facile purification by reversed-phase HPLC enabled product isolation within hours.