Belief, Knowledge and Expertise. The emergence of the lay expert in medical sociology

The paper has three main aims. First, to trace – through the pages of the Journal – the changing ways in which lay understandings of health and illness have been represented during the 1979-2002 period. Second, to say something about the limits of lay knowledge (and particularly lay expertise) in matters of health and medicine. Third, to call for a re-assessment of what lay people can offer to a democratised and customer sensitive system of health care and to attempt to draw a boundary around the domain of expertise. In following through on those aims, the author calls upon data derived from three current projects. These latter concern the diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease in people with Down’s syndrome; the development of an outcome measure for people who have suffered a traumatic brain injury; and a study of why older people might reject annual influenza vaccinations. Key words: Lay health beliefs, lay expertise, Alzheimer’s, Traumatic Brain Injury, Vaccinations

Analyzing the degree of conflict among belief functions.

The study of alternative combination rules in DS theory when evidence is in conflict has emerged again recently as an interesting topic, especially in data/information fusion applications. These studies have mainly focused on investigating which alternative would be appropriate for which conflicting situation, under the assumption that a conflict is identified. The issue of detection (or identification) of conflict among evidence has been ignored. In this paper, we formally define when two basic belief assignments are in conflict. This definition deploys quantitative measures of both the mass of the combined belief assigned to the emptyset before normalization and the distance between betting commitments of beliefs.We argue that only when both measures are high, it is safe to say the evidence is in conflict. This definition can be served as a prerequisite for selecting appropriate combination rules.