'Dark Interpretations': Romanticism's Ambiguous Legacy in India

This essay argues that Romanticism’s legacy in modern Indian literature has been constructed under the shadow of its colonial heritage. Although the Romantic period witnessed the enthusiastic “discovery” of classical Indian literature by British Orientalists, Romantic imperialism (which went hand-in-hand with Romantic orientalism) played a darker role in instituting a colonial educational system in India which denigrated Indian languages and literatures. Modern Indian literature represented by popular fictional writers from R.K. Narayan to Arundhati Roy registers this complex colonial inheritance by its qualified and often ironic celebration of British Romantic literature along with its associated ideologies of freedom, truth, and beauty.

Ambiguous Devices

Developed and performed in collaboration with Tom Davis (Bournemouth University), the work explores notions of presence and absence, technologically mediated communication and audience perception through the staging of ambiguous but repeatable performative interactions taking place on a co-located but distributed musical instrument. Public performances and installations include: CCRMA, Stanford University (2012); NIME conference, University of Michigan (2012); SARC, Queen's University Belfast (2013); INTIME symposium, Coventry University (2013); RE-NEW digital arts festival, Copenhagen (2013).

Partial Cooperation in Strategic Decision Situations

We consider a normal form game in which there is a single exogenously given coalition of cooperating players that can write a binding agreement on pre-selected actions. These collective actions typically represent a certain number of dimensions in the players’ strategy space. The actions represented by the other dimensions of the strategy space remain under the complete, individual control of the players.
We consider a standard extension of the Nash equilibrium concept denoted as a partial cooperative equilibrium as well as an equilibrium concept in which the coalition of cooperators has a leadership position. Existence results are developed for these new equilibrium concepts. We identify conditions on these partial cooperative games under which the various equilibrium concepts are equivalent.
We apply this game theoretic framework to existing models of multi-market oligopolies and international pollution abatement. In a multi-market oligopoly typically a merger paradox emerges in the partial cooperative equilibrium, which vanishes if the cartel of collaborators exploits its leadership position. Our application to international pollution abatement treaties shows that cooperation by a sufficiently large group of countries results in a Pareto improvement over the standard tragedy of the commons outcome described by the Nash equilibrium.