Game-­theoretic Resource Allocation with Real-­time Probabilistic Surveillance Information

Game-theoretic security resource allocation problems have generated significant interest in the area of designing and developing security systems. These approaches traditionally utilize the Stackelberg game model for security resource scheduling in order to improve the protection of critical assets. The basic assumption in Stackelberg games is that a defender will act first, then an attacker will choose their best response after observing the defender’s strategy commitment (e.g., protecting a specific asset). Thus, it requires an attacker’s full or partial observation of a defender’s strategy. This assumption is unrealistic in real-time threat recognition and prevention. In this paper, we propose a new solution concept (i.e., a method to predict how a game will be played) for deriving the defender’s optimal strategy based on the principle of acceptable costs of minimax regret. Moreover, we demonstrate the advantages of this solution concept by analyzing its properties.

Subcellular localization of legionella Dot/Icm effectors

The translocation of effector proteins by the Dot/Icm type IV secretion system is central to the ability of Legionella pneumophila to persist and replicate within eukaryotic cells. The subcellular localization of translocated Dot/Icm proteins in host cells provides insight into their function. Through co-staining with host cell markers, effector proteins may be localized to specific subcellular compartments and membranes, which frequently reflects their host cell target and mechanism of action. In this chapter, we describe protocols to (1) localize effector proteins within cells by ectopic expression using green fluorescent protein fusions and (2) localize effector proteins within infected cells using epitope-tagged effector proteins and immuno-fluorescence microscopy.