Thanking the Greeks: The Crisis of the Rule of Law in EU Enlargement Regulation

This paper showcases the weaknesses of EU enlargement law and demonstrates how one Member State – namely, Greece – is notable for abusing this weakness, for harming the candidate countries, the EU, and the institutions alike, for stripping the EU position of its predictability, and for undermining the EU Commission’s efforts. Accordingly, Greece has severely incapacitated the key procedural rule of law component of the EU’s enlargement regulation, turning it into a randomised political game and ignoring any long-term goals of stability, prosperity, and peace that the process is to stand for. Following a walk through Greece’s engagement throughout a number of enlargement rounds, the paper concludes that the duty of loyalty – which is presumably able to discipline Member States that undermine the common effort – should find a new meaning in the context of EU enlargement.

The EU Clinical Trials Regulation: Key Priorities, Purposes and Aims and the Implications for Public Health

The replacement of the European Union (EU) Clinical Trials Directive by the new Clinical Trials Regulation (CTR), which entered into force on 16 June 2014 but will not apply before 28 May 2016, provides an opportunity to review the legal and political context within which this important aspect of research law and policy sits and to reflect on the implications for public health. My aim in this article is to relate the context to the key purposes and aims of EU law and policy on clinical trials in order to explain and clarify its orientation. On that basis, I argue that the CTR and the changes it introduces to the law on clinical trials are part of the EU's continued focus on market optimisation. It is this focus that orients and directs the wider pharmaceutical development pipeline, but that undermines the achievement of key public health objectives.

Employment regulation, game theory, and the lacuna in employee participation in liberal economies

Employee participation is a vital ingredient of what the International Labour Organization (ILO) calls ‘representation security’. This article provides theoretical and empirical insights relating to social policy impact of worker participation, specifically the European Information and Consultation Directive (ICD) for employee voice rights. While existing research on the ICD offers important empirical insights, there is a need for further theoretical analysis to examine the potential effectiveness of the regulations in liberal market economies (LMEs). Drawing on data from 16 case studies, the article uses game theory and the prisoner's dilemma framework to explain why national implementing legislation is largely ineffective in diffusing mutual gains cooperation in two LMEs: UK and the Republic of Ireland. Three theoretical (metaphorical) propositions advance understanding of the policy impact of national information & consultation regulations in LMEs.