Reva Siegel and the Role of Religion in Constructing the Meaning of ‘Human Dignity

The “religious understanding” of dignity is a topic of considerable complexity and is the subject of extensive scholarship. In this paper, I consider understandings of dignity that are currently under discussion in Roman Catholic circles, not least because Catholic discussions of dignity are often seen as influential in public policy and legal interpretation, directly and indirectly. I shall focus on one relatively neglected issue in legal scholarship: how scholars go about the task of identifying what a particular religion’s understanding of human dignity involves.
To illustrate the methodological problems that such an enterprise raises, I shall take one attempt by a scholar writing in the field of secular legal scholarship to describe Catholic understandings of dignity in the context of abortion and same-sex marriage. The discussion is that of Reva Siegel, an academic lawyer at Yale University; her recent analysis of differing understandings of dignity illustrates some of the issues that arise when the secular scholarly community addresses religious understandings of dignity.

In Pursuit of Human Dignity

The discussion of human dignity raises such complex issues, and the issues that current scholarship now considers central to its understanding are so daunting, that we are in danger of not being able to see the forest for the trees. This Introduction forms the first chapter of a book of essays (Christopher McCrudden (ed.), UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY,
Proceedings of the British Academy/Oxford University Press, in press) by a multi-disciplinary group of historians, legal academics, judges, political scientists, theologians, and philosophers, arising from a Conference held in Rhodes House, Oxford In June 2012. The Introduction aims to provide a guide, a map, through the thicket of current dignity scholarship. It situates the subsequent chapters of the book within an overview of the terrain that currently constitutes debates about the use of dignity in these fields. I have not attempted to put forward my own
comprehensive account of dignity. Mostly based on the rich conversations that took place at the Conference, I have sought, rather, to probe the potential strengths and weaknesses of all of the principal positions identified, at least in some contexts taking on the role of a Devil’s Advocate.

Childhood, Rights and Justice in Northern Ireland

Building on primary research and previous publications (Haydon, 2012; Haydon, 2014; Haydon and Scraton, 2008; McAlister, Scraton and Haydon, 2009; Scraton and Haydon, 2002), this chapter will provide a critical analysis of children’s rights and youth justice in Northern Ireland. More broadly, it will consider recent research concerning the criminalisation of children and young people in the United Kingdom and profound concerns regarding the policing and regulation of children raised in successive concluding observations about the UK Government’s implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, 1995, 2002, 2008). From this generic context, the chapter will map the ‘particular circumstances’ of Northern Ireland - a discrete legal jurisdiction to which powers for justice and policing were devolved only in 2010. Emerging from four decades of conflict and progressing through an uneasy ‘peace’, rights-based institutions and enabling legislation have, in principle, promoted and protected human rights. Yet children and young people living in communities marginalised by poverty and the legacy of conflict continue to experience inconsistent formal regulation by the police and the criminal justice system, while enduring often brutal informal regulation by paramilitaries. The chapter will explore evident tensions between the dynamics of criminalisation and promotion/ protection of children’s rights in a society transitioning from conflict. Further, it will analyse the challenges to securing children’s rights principles and provisions within a hostile political and ideological context, arguing for a critical rights-based agenda that promotes social justice through rights compliance together with policies and practices that address the structural inequalities faced by children and young people.

A Pension for Injured Victims of the Troubles: Reparations or Reifying Victim Hierarchy?

Reparations have been often used victim-centred measures to redress both private harm and gross violations of human rights. However, with the increasing occurrence of internal armed conflict and political violence, identities of victims and perpetrators in protracted conflicts can become blurred for some individuals. In countries like Peru and Northern Ireland that have suffered protracted violence, victimhood has been contested around which individuals are seen as innocent and deserving to exclude any members of non-state armed groups from claiming reparations. This article explores the issue of a proposed bill on a pension for injured victims of the Troubles in Northern Ireland. It identifies that there is no consistent state practice or human rights jurisprudence in this area, but instead offers a more complex approach through four models that can grapple with the seeming diametrically opposed victimhood and responsibility, by including victimised-perpetrators in reparations programmes such as that proposed for a pension of seriously injured victims in Northern Ireland.

Bouyid v Belgium: The “minimum level of severity” and Human Dignity's Role in Article 3 ECHR

The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights recently delivered an important judgment on Article 3 ECHR in the case of Bouyid v Belgium. In Bouyid, the Grand Chamber was called upon to consider whether slaps inflicted on a minor and an adult in police custody were in breach of Article 3 ECHR, which provides that ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. Overruling the Chamber judgment in the case, the Grand Chamber ruled by 14 votes to 3 that there had been a substantive violation of Article 3 in that the applicants had been subjected to degrading treatment by members of the Belgian police; it found that there had been a breach of the investigative duty under Article 3 also. In this comment, I focus on the fundamental basis of disagreement between the majority of the Grand Chamber and those who found themselves in dissent, on the question of whether there had been a substantive breach of Article 3. The crux of the disagreement lay in the understanding and application of the test of ‘minimum level of severity’, which the ECtHR has established as decisive of whether a particular form of ill-treatment crosses the Article 3 threshold, seen also in light of Article 3’s absolute character, which makes it non-displaceable – that is, immune to trade-offs of the type applicable in relation to qualified rights such as privacy and freedom of expression. I consider the way the majority of the Grand Chamber unpacked and applied the concept of dignity – or ‘human dignity’ – towards finding a substantive breach of Article 3, and briefly distil some of the principles underpinning the understanding of human dignity emerging in the Court’s analysis.