Childhood, Rights and Justice in Northern Ireland

Building on primary research and previous publications (Haydon, 2012; Haydon, 2014; Haydon and Scraton, 2008; McAlister, Scraton and Haydon, 2009; Scraton and Haydon, 2002), this chapter will provide a critical analysis of children’s rights and youth justice in Northern Ireland. More broadly, it will consider recent research concerning the criminalisation of children and young people in the United Kingdom and profound concerns regarding the policing and regulation of children raised in successive concluding observations about the UK Government’s implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, 1995, 2002, 2008). From this generic context, the chapter will map the ‘particular circumstances’ of Northern Ireland - a discrete legal jurisdiction to which powers for justice and policing were devolved only in 2010. Emerging from four decades of conflict and progressing through an uneasy ‘peace’, rights-based institutions and enabling legislation have, in principle, promoted and protected human rights. Yet children and young people living in communities marginalised by poverty and the legacy of conflict continue to experience inconsistent formal regulation by the police and the criminal justice system, while enduring often brutal informal regulation by paramilitaries. The chapter will explore evident tensions between the dynamics of criminalisation and promotion/ protection of children’s rights in a society transitioning from conflict. Further, it will analyse the challenges to securing children’s rights principles and provisions within a hostile political and ideological context, arguing for a critical rights-based agenda that promotes social justice through rights compliance together with policies and practices that address the structural inequalities faced by children and young people.

Bouyid v Belgium: The “minimum level of severity” and Human Dignity's Role in Article 3 ECHR

The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights recently delivered an important judgment on Article 3 ECHR in the case of Bouyid v Belgium. In Bouyid, the Grand Chamber was called upon to consider whether slaps inflicted on a minor and an adult in police custody were in breach of Article 3 ECHR, which provides that ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. Overruling the Chamber judgment in the case, the Grand Chamber ruled by 14 votes to 3 that there had been a substantive violation of Article 3 in that the applicants had been subjected to degrading treatment by members of the Belgian police; it found that there had been a breach of the investigative duty under Article 3 also. In this comment, I focus on the fundamental basis of disagreement between the majority of the Grand Chamber and those who found themselves in dissent, on the question of whether there had been a substantive breach of Article 3. The crux of the disagreement lay in the understanding and application of the test of ‘minimum level of severity’, which the ECtHR has established as decisive of whether a particular form of ill-treatment crosses the Article 3 threshold, seen also in light of Article 3’s absolute character, which makes it non-displaceable – that is, immune to trade-offs of the type applicable in relation to qualified rights such as privacy and freedom of expression. I consider the way the majority of the Grand Chamber unpacked and applied the concept of dignity – or ‘human dignity’ – towards finding a substantive breach of Article 3, and briefly distil some of the principles underpinning the understanding of human dignity emerging in the Court’s analysis.