Bouyid v Belgium: The “minimum level of severity” and Human Dignity's Role in Article 3 ECHR

The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights recently delivered an important judgment on Article 3 ECHR in the case of Bouyid v Belgium. In Bouyid, the Grand Chamber was called upon to consider whether slaps inflicted on a minor and an adult in police custody were in breach of Article 3 ECHR, which provides that ‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. Overruling the Chamber judgment in the case, the Grand Chamber ruled by 14 votes to 3 that there had been a substantive violation of Article 3 in that the applicants had been subjected to degrading treatment by members of the Belgian police; it found that there had been a breach of the investigative duty under Article 3 also. In this comment, I focus on the fundamental basis of disagreement between the majority of the Grand Chamber and those who found themselves in dissent, on the question of whether there had been a substantive breach of Article 3. The crux of the disagreement lay in the understanding and application of the test of ‘minimum level of severity’, which the ECtHR has established as decisive of whether a particular form of ill-treatment crosses the Article 3 threshold, seen also in light of Article 3’s absolute character, which makes it non-displaceable – that is, immune to trade-offs of the type applicable in relation to qualified rights such as privacy and freedom of expression. I consider the way the majority of the Grand Chamber unpacked and applied the concept of dignity – or ‘human dignity’ – towards finding a substantive breach of Article 3, and briefly distil some of the principles underpinning the understanding of human dignity emerging in the Court’s analysis.

Balancing Rights in Religious Education through Collaboration and Dialogue

While the right of parents to educate their children in their religious or philosophical conviction is recognised in Human Rights instruments (e.g. CoE 1952, protocol 1), educators must also attend to the right of a child to autonomy (UN 1989, Article 12.1) and the right of liberal democratic states to reproduce values of equity and freedom. This paper argues that certain forms of inter-religious dialogue and/or inter-religious collaborative learning can assist educators in balancing these rights where religion has significant influence and power over the management of schools and/or the curriculum. It is argued that in addition to the learning benefits which may result, the use of collaboration and dialogue goes some way in addressing three philosophical criticisms of religious education: first that religiously separate and religiously based education pays insufficient attention to the rights of children and, secondly, is likely to contribute to social fragmentation; and third, pupils will lack the skills to overcome prejudice or intolerance where they have no experience of others as a result of separate schooling or from a religiously narrow curriculum, and the latter may in fact support intolerant views. A rationale is developed that asserts the value of collaboration or dialogue as a pedagogical strategy that can, to some degree, mitigate potential negative outcomes from religious education. This argument is further supported with reference to a range of empirical studies.