221 resultados para Sexual ethics.
Resumo:
Speaking out about sexual violence has been a fundamental part of feminist politics since the 1970s. The practice of narrating experiences of violence, either publicly or to friends and family aims to combat the culture of silence and stigmatisation that surrounds sexual violence while also helping individuals to gain a sense of empowerment and connect with other survivors. However, speaking out also contains inherent risks, especially for young people. Survivors may meet with stigmatising or disbelieving responses, and they may lose control over who knows their story and the way in which it is told and retold.
These risks and benefits are altered, and potentially exacerbated, in an online environment. While social media may increase survivors’ ability to contact and connect with others with similar experiences it also makes it harder to control when and how their story is shared. The disjuncture between online and offline environments may also increase feelings of stigmatisation and isolation.
There is a need to explore the specific risks and benefits of speaking out online given both young people’s extensive use of social media for social interactions and the increasing tendency for support and educational services targeted at young people to make use of social media and online environments. This paper draws on literature and some preliminary research to consider both risks and benefits of speaking out online and to open a conversation about the creation of supportive spaces and mechanisms for young people to speak about sexual violence in online environments.
Resumo:
There is ample evidence that young people engage in grooming and harmful sexual behaviour (HSB) using social media with enough frequency to make those behaviours important con-cerns for both society and care providers. This article provides a critical overview of the con-ceptual and empirical foundations of peer-to-peer grooming and the use of social media with-in the context of HSB. Based on this learning, it ultimately introduces a new model of inter-vention and of professional practice, which provides the standards for micro-level decision-making about goals, methods and assessment tailored to this specific offending context.
Resumo:
This article notes that while ethics is increasingly talked of in foreign policy, it remains a blind-spot for FPA. It argues that this must be rectified through a critical approach which conceptualises foreign policy as ethics. The first section examines how even constructivist approaches, which are highly attuned to the intersubjective sphere, still generally avoid dealing with morality. The second section looks at the possibilities and limits of one piece of constructivist theorizing that explores the translation of morality into foreign policy via ‘norms’. This demonstrates the problems that a constructivist account, with its tendency toward explanatory description without evaluation, will always face. The final section argues, through an examination of EU foreign policy (from 1999-2004) and its innovative use of ‘hospitality’, that FPA must critically reassess the value of the norms and principles by which foreign policy operates in order to suggest potentially more ethical modes of encounter.
Resumo:
This article argues for the importance of hospitality in discussions of international ethics, suggesting that, while Jacques Derrida’s thought on the concept ought to be central, we also need to go beyond it. In particular, Derrida’s focus on the threshold moment of sovereign decision has the effect of reinforcing International Relations’ focus on the state as the only ethical actor and space. In contrast, this article suggests that we think of hospitality as a spatial relation with affective dimensions and a practice that continues once the guest crosses the threshold of the home. Conceived as such, hospitality reveals a constitutive relation between ethics, power and space, which directs us to the way hospitality produces international spaces and manages them through various tactics seeking to contain the resistant guest. This argument is illustrated through an examination of perhaps the most urgent of contemporary international ethical spaces: the refugee camp.
Resumo:
Libertarian paternalism, as advanced by Cass Sunstein, is seriously flawed, but not primarily for the reasons that most commentators suggest. Libertarian paternalism and its attendant regulatory implications are too libertarian, not too paternalistic, and as a result are in considerable tension with ‘thick’ conceptions of human dignity. We make four arguments. The first is that there is no justification for a presumption in favor of nudging as a default regulatory strategy, as Sunstein asserts. It is ordinarily less effective than mandates; such mandates rarely offend personal autonomy; and the central reliance on cognitive failures in the nudging program is more likely to offend human dignity than the mandates it seeks to replace. Secondly, we argue that nudging as a regulatory strategy fits both overtly and covertly, often insidiously, into a more general libertarian program of political economy. Thirdly, while we are on the whole more concerned to reject the libertarian than the paternalistic elements of this philosophy, Sunstein’s work, both in Why Nudge?, and earlier, fails to appreciate how nudging may be manipulative if not designed with more care than he acknowledges. Lastly, because of these characteristics, nudging might even be subject to legal challenges that would give us the worst of all possible regulatory worlds: a weak regulatory intervention that is liable to be challenged in the courts by well-resourced interest groups. In such a scenario, and contrary to the ‘common sense’ ethos contended for in Why Nudge?, nudges might not even clear the excessively low bar of doing something rather than nothing. Those seeking to pursue progressive politics, under law, should reject nudging in favor of regulation that is more congruent with principles of legality, more transparent, more effective, more democratic, and allows us more fully to act as moral agents. Such a system may have a place for (some) nudging, but not one that departs significantly from how labeling, warnings and the like already function, and nothing that compares with Sunstein’s apparent ambitions for his new movement.