The Effect of Community-Based Specialist Palliative Care Teams on Place of Care

BACKGROUND: Prior research on community-based specialist palliative care teams used outcome measures of place of death and/or dichotomous outcome measures of acute care use in the last two weeks of life. However, existing research seldom measured the diverse places of care used and their timing prior to death.

OBJECTIVE: The study objective was to examine the place of care in the last 30 days of life.

METHODS: In this retrospective cohort study, patients who received care from a specialist palliative care team (exposed) were matched by propensity score to patients who received usual care in the community (unexposed) in Ontario, Canada. Measured was the percentage of patients in each place of care in the last month of life as a proportion of the total cohort.

RESULTS: After matching, 3109 patients were identified in each group, where 79% had cancer and 77% received end-of-life home care. At 30 days compared to 7 days before death, the exposed group's proportions rose from 33% to 41% receiving home care and 14% to 15% in hospital, whereas the unexposed group's proportions rose from 28% to 32% receiving home care and 16% to 22% in hospital. Linear trend analysis (proportion over time) showed that the exposed group used significantly more home care services and fewer hospital days (p < 0.001) than the unexposed group. On the last day of life (place of death), the exposed group had 18% die in an in-patient hospital bed compared to 29% in usual care.

CONCLUSION: Examining place of care in the last month can effectively illustrate the service use trajectory over time.

The Dark Side of Nudging: The Ethics, Political Economy, and Law of Libertarian Paternalism

Libertarian paternalism, as advanced by Cass Sunstein, is seriously flawed, but not primarily for the reasons that most commentators suggest. Libertarian paternalism and its attendant regulatory implications are too libertarian, not too paternalistic, and as a result are in considerable tension with ‘thick’ conceptions of human dignity. We make four arguments. The first is that there is no justification for a presumption in favor of nudging as a default regulatory strategy, as Sunstein asserts. It is ordinarily less effective than mandates; such mandates rarely offend personal autonomy; and the central reliance on cognitive failures in the nudging program is more likely to offend human dignity than the mandates it seeks to replace. Secondly, we argue that nudging as a regulatory strategy fits both overtly and covertly, often insidiously, into a more general libertarian program of political economy. Thirdly, while we are on the whole more concerned to reject the libertarian than the paternalistic elements of this philosophy, Sunstein’s work, both in Why Nudge?, and earlier, fails to appreciate how nudging may be manipulative if not designed with more care than he acknowledges. Lastly, because of these characteristics, nudging might even be subject to legal challenges that would give us the worst of all possible regulatory worlds: a weak regulatory intervention that is liable to be challenged in the courts by well-resourced interest groups. In such a scenario, and contrary to the ‘common sense’ ethos contended for in Why Nudge?, nudges might not even clear the excessively low bar of doing something rather than nothing. Those seeking to pursue progressive politics, under law, should reject nudging in favor of regulation that is more congruent with principles of legality, more transparent, more effective, more democratic, and allows us more fully to act as moral agents. Such a system may have a place for (some) nudging, but not one that departs significantly from how labeling, warnings and the like already function, and nothing that compares with Sunstein’s apparent ambitions for his new movement.

Philosophy and Political Engagement: Reflection in the Public Sphere

Do philosophers have a responsibility to their society that is distinct from their responsibility to it as citizens? This edited volume explores both what type of contribution philosophy can make and what type of reasoning is appropriate when addressing public matters now. These questions are posed by leading international scholars working in the fields of moral and political philosophy. Each contribution also investigates the central issue of how to combine critical, rational analysis with a commitment to politically relevant public engagement. The contributions to this volume analyse issues raised in practical ethics, including abortion, embryology, and assisted suicide. They consider the role of ethical commitment in the philosophical analysis of contemporary political issues, and engage with matters of public policy such as poverty, the arts, meaningful work, as well as the evidence base for policy. They also examine the normative legitimacy of power, including the use of violence.