Inter-observer agreement in evaluating the anterior chamber angle by ultrasound biomicroscopy

Purpose. To determine the agreement between observers in estimating the configuration of the human anterior chamber angle (ACA) using ultrasound biomicroscopy (UBM). Methods. Two masked clinicians used UBM images to estimate, in 41 eyes, the configuration of the ACA, especially (1) the position of contact between the peripheral iris and the inside of the eye wall, (2) the angularity of the approach to the ACA, and (3) the curvature of the peripheral iris. Agreement between observers was evaluated by the kappa statistic. Results. Inter-observer agreement in assessing the iris insertion (kappa = 0.79), angular width (Kappa = 0.95), and the peripheral iris curvature (kappa = 0.84) was high. Conclusions. The agreement between observers in evaluating the anterior chamber angle configuration by UBM was excellent.

Mutational spectrum of the ZEB1 gene in corneal dystrophies supports a genotype-phenotype correlation

Mutations in ZEB1 have been reported in posterior polymorphous corneal dystrophy (PPCD3; MIM #609141) and Fuchs' endothelial corneal dystrophy (FECD6; MIM #613270). Although PPCD and keratoconus are clinically and pathologically distinct, PPCD has been associated with keratoconus, suggesting a common genetic basis. The purpose of our study was to perform mutational screening of the ZEB1 gene in patients affected with keratoconus or PPCD.

The Polish Competition Authority Publishes its Annual Report for 2012

In May 2013 the President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK), the Polish Competition Authority, published its Annual Report for 2012. This piece provides an overview of the reported activities within the competition law & policy domain, and comments on some of them.

University Competition, Grading Standards, and Grade Inflation

We develop a model of strategic grade determination by universities distinguished by their distributions of student academic abilities. Universities choose grading standards to maximize the total wages of graduates, taking into account how the grading standards affect firms' productivity assessment and job placement. We identify conditions under which better universities set lower grading standards, exploiting the fact that firms cannot distinguish between good and badA''s. In contrast, a social planner sets stricter standards at better universities. We show how increases in skilled jobs drive grade inflation, and determine when grading standards fall faster at better schools. (JEL I21)