A Human Rights Perspective on Citizen Participation in the EU's Governance of New Technologies

This article considers the EU’s approach to citizen participation in the governance of new technologies from a human rights perspective. Noting that there is a dearth of insight on the interplay between citizen participation and human rights, the article sketches the essence of its own human rights perspective as being about empowerment. This perspective is brought to bear on EU discourse on citizen participation in the governance of new technologies. Analysis of the discourse—comprising law, citizen participation in EU governance and citizen/science relations, the ‘public understanding of science and technology’, risk and bioethics—reveals a disempowering ‘deficit model’ of citizens in need of education through their participation in governance. The analysis thus suggests that citizen participation in EU governance of new technologies is not truly informed by human rights, but is instead used as a legitimating technique.

Realising political equality: the European Court of Human Rights and positive obligations in a democracy'

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) speaks of the importance of an “effective political democracy” in its Preamble, though it is only in Article 3 of Protocol 1 (P1-3) that we find a right to free elections. This paper discusses the role of “positive obligations” under P1-3. This paper outlines the positive obligations in P1-3 focusing on obligations where the state is required to do more than just change the law. This may mean providing resources or facilities, adopting regulatory frameworks or creating new institutions. The paper highlights specific positive obligations that need to be further developed in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Sometimes these can be developed by analogy with positive obligations recognised in other areas of ECtHR jurisprudence. However, beyond these cases, states should ensure that members of vulnerable and disadvantaged minorities are able to participate in the electoral process and should ensure that dominant political groups cannot abuse their political power to exclude other parties unfairly. This is necessary to realise equal political rights. The second section of this paper sketches some preliminary points about the Strasbourg institutions’ approach to P1-3. After that, the third section identifies circumstances where the ECtHR should apply a more intense scrutiny in P1-3 cases. The fourth, fifth and sixth sections look at positive obligations relating to the right to vote, the right to run for election and the regulation of political parties.

The Victim Test under the Human Rights Act 1998 and its Implications for Domestic Violence Cases

The European Court of Human Rights has now clearly established that domestic violence constitutes a human rights issue. However, there are a number of difficulties involved in using the Human Rights Act 1998 in relation to violence against women in the home. One of these obstacles is the restrictive test of standing found in the Act, which is problematic as regards an ‘unseen crime’ such as domestic violence. This article examines this test of standing and the difficulties it poses in the context of violence against women in the home. It then considers alternative models for the standing requirement and assesses whether a change in the test of standing would produce beneficial results as regards the issue of domestic violence.

Human Rights in the Courts of Northern Ireland 2009-10

This article surveys and comments on the decisions issued on human rights points by courts in Northern Ireland during the legal year 2009-2010.

The Fundamental Rights Agency of the EU A New Panopticism

The Fundamental Rights Agency of the European Union (FRA) is the EU’s newest, and only, human rights institution. The FRA represents a new way of speaking about rights in the EU, using ‘governance’ language. It was not conceived as a traditional human rights monitoring body and the monitoring mission was actively abandoned in favour of an advisory one. This article examines how the FRA’s governance-related role actually reveals a type of monitoring best understood as ‘surveillance’ in a critical, Foucauldian sense. In exercising surveillance tactics, the FRA represents a model of panopticism which allows it to carry out a new form of government. This is an interesting observation not only because of the implications it has for an EU that is striving to move away from government towards governance, but also because it challenges the assumption of the FRA as a ‘beacon on fundamental rights’ and a model of apolitical progress.