Business Intelligence and Multi-market Competition

We consider a multi-market framework where a set of firms compete on two oligopolistic markets. The cost of production of each firm allows for spillovers across markets, ensuring that output decisions for both markets have to be made jointly. Prior to competing in these markets, firms can establish links gathering business intelligence about other firms. A link formed by a firm generates two types of externalities for competitors and consumers. We characterize the business intelligence equilibrium networks and networks that maximize social welfare. By contrast with single market competition, we show that in multi-market competition there exist situations where intelligence gathering activities are underdeveloped with regard to social welfare and should be tolerated, if not encouraged, by public authorities.

Faith-based Non-Governmental Organizations in the Public Square

This chapter has both a methodological and a substantive aim. First, I suggest, using the role and function of NGOs in religiously related legal disputes as a paradigm example, the distinction between institutional, doctrinal, and theoretical approaches to the study of the relationship between religion and law is sometimes unhelpful, creating a barrier preventing us from understanding the phenomenon that we are examining. Instead, I suggest, a more integrated understanding, drawing on each of these approaches and seeing how they relate to each other, may well be more illuminating. The second aim of this chapter is to suggest, in a preliminary way, that the phenomenon of faith-based organizations should be more integrated than in the past into doctrinal and theoretical debates in the area of law and religion, in particular the problem of how liberal society is to engage with organized religion where there is a fundamental dispute as to who represents that religion, or as to what the basic tenets of that religion are.

Market Economies with an Endogenous Social Division of Labour

This paper considers a general equilibrium theory of a competitive market economy with an endogenous social division of labour. The theory is founded on the notion of a “consumer- producer”, who consumes as well as produces commodities. In this approach, the emergence of a meaningful social division of labour is guided by the property of increasing returns to specialisation and the process of trade among fully specialised individuals. All decisions of individual consumer-producers are based on a set of perfectly competitive market prices of the commodities in the economy.
We show that a perfectly competitive price mechanism supports a dichotomy of production and consumption at the level of the individual consumer-producer. In this context we show existence of competitive equilibria and characterise these equilibria under increasing returns to specialisation: Under certain well-described conditions, markets are equilibrated through adjustment of the social division of labour; therefore prices are fully determined by the supply side of the economy.

The significance of interconnector counter-trading in a security constrained electricity market

Throughout the European Union there is an increasing amount of wind generation being dispatched-down due to the binding of power system operating constraints from high levels of wind generation. This paper examines the impact a system non-synchronous penetration limit has on the dispatch-down of wind and quantifies the significance of interconnector counter-trading to the priority dispatching of wind power. A fully coupled economic dispatch and security constrained unit commitment model of the Single Electricity Market of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland and the British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangement was used in this study. The key finding was interconnector counter-trading reduces the impact the system non-synchronous penetration limit has on the dispatch-down of wind. The capability to counter-trade on the interconnectors and an increase in system non-synchronous penetration limit from 50% to 55% reduces the dispatch-down of wind by 311 GW h and decreases total electricity payments to the consumer by €1.72/MW h. In terms of the European Union electricity market integration, the results show the importance of developing individual electricity markets that allow system operators to counter-trade on interconnectors to ensure the priority dispatch of the increasing levels of wind generation.

EU Social and Labour Rights and EU Internal Market Law: Study for the EMPL Committee

EU Social and Labour Rights have developed incrementally, originally through a set of legislative initiatives creating selective employment rights, followed by a non-binding Charter of Social Rights. Only in 2009, social and labour rights became legally binding through the Charter of Fundamental Rights for the European Union (CFREU). By contrast, the EU Internal Market - an area without frontiers where goods, persons, services and capital can circulate freely – has been enshrined in legally enforceable Treaty provisions from 1958. These comprise the economic freedoms guaranteeing said free circulation and a system ensuring that competition is not distorted within the Internal Market (Protocol 27 to the Treaty of Lisbon). Tensions between Internal Market law and social and labour rights have been observed in analyses of EU case law and legislation. This study explores responses by socio-economic and political actors at national and EU levels to such tensions, focusing on collective labour rights, rights to fair working conditions and rights to social security and social assistance (Articles 12, 28, 31, 34 Charter of Fundamental Rights for the European Union). On the basis of the current Treaties and the CFREU, the constitutionally conditioned Internal Market emerges as a way to overcome the perception that social and labour rights limit Internal Market law, or vice versa. On this basis, alternative responses to perceived tensions are proposed, focused on posting of workers, furthering fair employment conditions through public procurement and enabling effective collective bargaining and industrial action in the Internal Market.

Scaling Up Market Anomalies

This paper implements momentum among a host of market anomalies. Our investment universe consists of the 15 top (long-leg) and 15 bottom (short-leg) anomaly portfolios. The proposed active strategy buys (sells short) a subset of the top (bottom) anomaly portfolios based on past one-month return. The evidence shows statistically strong and economically meaningful persistence in anomaly payoffs. Our strategy consistently outperforms a naive benchmark that equal weights anomalies and yields an abnormal monthly return ranging between 1.27% and 1.47%. The persistence is robust to the post-2000 period, and various other considerations, and is stronger following episodes of high investor sentiment.