23 resultados para algebraic attacks


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Suppose X is a projective toric scheme defined over a ring R and equipped with an ample line bundle L . We prove that its K-theory has a direct summand of the form K(R)(k+1) where k = 0 is minimal such that L?(-k-1) is not acyclic. Using a combinatorial description of quasi-coherent sheaves we interpret and prove this result for a ring R which is either commutative, or else left noetherian.

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This paper is a contribution to Mathematical fuzzy logic, in particular to the algebraic study of t-norm based fuzzy logics. In the general framework of propositional core and ?-core fuzzy logics we consider three properties of completeness with respect to any semantics of linearly ordered algebras. Useful algebraic characterizations of these completeness properties are obtained and their relations are studied. Moreover, we concentrate on five kinds of distinguished semantics for these logics-namely the class of algebras defined over the real unit interval, the rational unit interval, the hyperreals (all ultrapowers of the real unit interval), the strict hyperreals (only ultrapowers giving a proper extension of the real unit interval) and finite chains, respectively-and we survey the known completeness methods and results for prominent logics. We also obtain new interesting relations between the real, rational and (strict) hyperreal semantics, and good characterizations for the completeness with respect to the semantics of finite chains. Finally, all completeness properties and distinguished semantics are also considered for the first-order versions of the logics where a number of new results are proved. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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This paper investigates cyber attacks on ICS which rely on IEC 60870-5-104 for telecontrol communications. The main focus of the paper is on man-in-the-middle attacks, covering modification and injection of commands, it also details capture and replay attacks. An initial set of attacks are preformed on a local software simulated laboratory. Final experiments and validation of a man-in-the-middle attack are performed in a comprehensive testbed environment in conjunction with an electricity distribution operator.

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Side-channel analysis of cryptographic systems can allow for the recovery of secret information by an adversary even where the underlying algorithms have been shown to be provably secure. This is achieved by exploiting the unintentional leakages inherent in the underlying implementation of the algorithm in software or hardware. Within this field of research, a class of attacks known as profiling attacks, or more specifically as used here template attacks, have been shown to be extremely efficient at extracting secret keys. Template attacks assume a strong adversarial model, in that an attacker has an identical device with which to profile the power consumption of various operations. This can then be used to efficiently attack the target device. Inherent in this assumption is that the power consumption across the devices under test is somewhat similar. This central tenet of the attack is largely unexplored in the literature with the research community generally performing the profiling stage on the same device as being attacked. This is beneficial for evaluation or penetration testing as it is essentially the best case scenario for an attacker where the model built during the profiling stage matches exactly that of the target device, however it is not necessarily a reflection on how the attack will work in reality. In this work, a large scale evaluation of this assumption is performed, comparing the key recovery performance across 20 identical smart-cards when performing a profiling attack.