Secrecy Capacity Analysis Over κ–μ Fading Channels: Theory and Applications

In this paper, we consider the transmission of confidential information over a κ-μ fading channel in the presence of an eavesdropper who also experiences κ-μ fading. In particular, we obtain novel analytical solutions for the probability of strictly positive secrecy capacity (SPSC) and a lower bound of secure outage probability (SOPL) for independent and non-identically distributed channel coefficients without parameter constraints. We also provide a closed-form expression for the probability of SPSC when the μ parameter is assumed to take positive integer values. Monte-Carlo simulations are performed to verify the derived results. The versatility of the κ-μ fading model means that the results presented in this paper can be used to determine the probability of SPSC and SOPL for a large number of other fading scenarios, such as Rayleigh, Rice (Nakagamin), Nakagami-m, One-Sided Gaussian, and mixtures of these common fading models. In addition, due to the duality of the analysis of secrecy capacity and co-channel interference (CCI), the results presented here will have immediate applicability in the analysis of outage probability in wireless systems affected by CCI and background noise (BN). To demonstrate the efficacy of the novel formulations proposed here, we use the derived equations to provide a useful insight into the probability of SPSC and SOPL for a range of emerging wireless applications, such as cellular device-to-device, peer-to-peer, vehicle-to-vehicle, and body centric communications using data obtained from real channel measurements.

Effective network security monitoring: from attribution to target-centric monitoring

Network security monitoring remains a challenge. As global networks scale up, in terms of traffic, volume and speed, effective attribution of cyber attacks is increasingly difficult. The problem is compounded by a combination of other factors, including the architecture of the Internet, multi-stage attacks and increasing volumes of nonproductive traffic. This paper proposes to shift the focus of security monitoring from the source to the target. Simply put, resources devoted to detection and attribution should be redeployed to efficiently monitor for targeting and prevention of attacks. The effort of detection should aim to determine whether a node is under attack, and if so, effectively prevent the attack. This paper contributes by systematically reviewing the structural, operational and legal reasons underlying this argument, and presents empirical evidence to support a shift away from attribution to favour of a target-centric monitoring approach. A carefully deployed set of experiments are presented and a detailed analysis of the results is achieved.

Towards a threat assessment framework for apps collusion

App collusion refers to two or more apps working together to achieve a malicious goal that they otherwise would not be able to achieve individually. The permissions based security model (PBSM) for Android does not address this threat, as it is rather limited to mitigating risks due to individual apps. This paper presents a technique for assessing the threat of collusion for apps, which is a first step towards quantifying collusion risk, and allows us to narrow down to candidate apps for collusion, which is critical given the high volume of Android apps available. We present our empirical analysis using a classified corpus of over 29000 Android apps provided by Intel Security.