The Definition of Slavery in International Law

On the basis of archival research, this Article considers the negotiation history of both the 1926 Slavery Convention and 1956 Supplementary Convention and demonstrates that an interpretation of the provisions of the definition of slavery consonant with the travaux préparatoires reveal a definition which provides for the possibility of holding States and individuals responsible for not only slavery de jure but also de facto. That understanding is premised on a reading of the definition that speaks not of the ‘ownership’ of one person by another; but of the powers attached to the right of ownership. It is through an exploration of this phrase that a proper understanding of the definition of slavery in international law emerges.

ARTICLE: On the Curious Disappearance of Human Servitude from General International Law

The following study considers the fragmentation of law which occurred in 1956 with regard to the law on servitude. As States were unwilling to go as far as the Universal Declaration on Human in establishing that "no one shall be held in [...] servitude", the negotiators of the 1956 Supplementary Conventions moved to expunge the very term 'servitude' from the text and to replace it with the phrase 'institutions and practices similar to slavery' which could then be abolished 'progressively and as soon as possible'. The negotiation history of the 1956 Convention clear demonstrate that the Universal Declaration on Human was the elephant in the room and that it ultimately lead to a fragmentation of the law as between general international law manifest in the 1956 Supplementary Convention on the one hand and international human rights law on the other. It is for this reason that, for instance the 2001 UN and 2005 Council of Europe trafficking conventions mention both 'practices similar to slavery' and 'servitude' as types of human exploitation to be suppressed in their definition of 'trafficking in persons'.

The Right to Self-Defence in National and International Law: The Role of the Imminence Requirement

This article explores the doctrine of self-defence within the context of the challenges directed at the imminence requirement, from the perspective of both national and international law. The article will attempt to illustrate that the requirement of imminence underlines the political character of the self-defence doctrine wherein private force may only be resorted to in the absence of institutional protection. This study will argue that the imminence rule can not merely be regarded as a "proxy" for establishing necessity; rather, the elements of imminence, necessity, and proportionality are inextricably connected to ensure that defensive force is only resorted to when national or international authorities are not in a position to prevent an illegal aggression, and that the defensive lethal force is not abused.