Do development and learning really decrease memory? On similarity and category-based induction in adults and children

In a recently published study, Sloutsky and Fisher [Sloutsky, V. M., & Fisher, A.V. (2004a). When development and learning decrease memory: Evidence against category-based induction in children. Psychological Science, 15, 553-558; Sloutsky, V. M., & Fisher, A. V. (2004b). Induction and categorization in young children: A similarity-based model. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133, 166-188.] demonstrated that children have better memory for the items that they generalise to than do adults. On the basis of this finding, they claim that children and adults use different mechanisms for inductive generalisations;whereas adults focus on shared category membership, children project properties on the basis of perceptual similarity. Sloutsky & Fisher attribute children's enhanced recognition memory to the more detailed processing required by this similarity-based mechanism. In Experiment I we show that children look at the stimulus items for longer than adults. In Experiment 2 we demonstrate that although when given just 250 ms to inspect the items children remain capable of making accurate inferences, their subsequent memory for those items decreases significantly. These findings suggest that there are no necessary conclusions to be drawn from Sloutsky & Fisher's results about developmental differences in generalisation strategy. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Who is susceptible to conjunction fallacies in category-based induction?

Recent evidence suggests that the conjunction fallacy observed in people's probabilistic reasoning is also to be found in their evaluations of inductive argument strength. We presented 130 participants with materials likely to produce a conjunction fallacy either by virtue of a shared categorical or a causal relationship between the categories in the argument. We also took a measure of participants' cognitive ability. We observed conjunction fallacies overall with both sets of materials but found an association with ability for the categorical materials only. Our results have implications for accounts of individual differences in reasoning, for the relevance theory of induction, and for the recent claim that causal knowledge is important in inductive reasoning.

How many processes underline category-based induction? Effect of conclusion specificity and cognitive ability

Two studies investigated participants' sensitivity to the amount and diversity of the evidence when reasoning inductively about categories. Both showed that participants are more sensitive to characteristics of the evidence for arguments with general rather than specific conclusions. Both showed an association between cognitive ability and sensitivity to these evidence characteristics, particularly when the conclusion category was general. These results suggest that a simple associative process may not be sufficient to capture some key phenomena of category-based induction. They also support the claim that the need to generate a superordinate category is a complicating factor in category-based reasoning and that adults' tendency to generate such categories while reasoning has been overestimated.

On the derived category of a regular toric scheme

Let X be a quasi-compact scheme, equipped with an open covering by affine schemes U s = Spec A s . A quasi-coherent sheaf on X gives rise, by taking sections over the U s , to a diagram of modules over the coordinate rings A s , indexed by the intersection poset S of the covering. If X is a regular toric scheme over an arbitrary commutative ring, we prove that the unbounded derived category of quasi-coherent sheaves on X can be obtained from a category of Sop-diagrams of chain complexes of modules by inverting maps which induce homology isomorphisms on hyper-derived inverse limits. Moreover, we show that there is a finite set of weak generators, one for each cone in the fan S. The approach taken uses the machinery of Bousfield–Hirschhorn colocalisation of model categories. The first step is to characterise colocal objects; these turn out to be homotopy sheaves in the sense that chain complexes over different open sets U s agree on intersections up to quasi-isomorphism. In a second step it is shown that the homotopy category of homotopy sheaves is equivalent to the derived category of X.

The Relevance Framework for Category-Based Induction: Evidence From Garden-Path Arguments

Relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson. 1995) suggests that people expend cognitive effort when processing information in proportion to the cognitive effects to be gained from doing so. This theory has been used to explain how people apply their knowledge appropriately when evaluating category-based inductive arguments (Medin, Coley, Storms, & Hayes, 2003). In such arguments, people are told that a property is true of premise categories and are asked to evaluate the likelihood that it is also true of conclusion categories. According to the relevance framework, reasoners generate hypotheses about the relevant relation between the categories in the argument. We reasoned that premises inconsistent with early hypotheses about the relevant relation would have greater effects than consistent premises. We designed three premise garden-path arguments where the same 3rd premise was either consistent or inconsistent with likely hypotheses about the relevant relation. In Experiments 1 and 2, we showed that effort expended processing consistent premises (measured via reading times) was significantly less than effort expended on inconsistent premises. In Experiment 2 and 3, we demonstrated a direct relation between cognitive effect and cognitive effort. For garden-path arguments, belief change given inconsistent 3rd premises was significantly correlated with Premise 3 (Experiment 3) and conclusion (Experiments 2 and 3) reading times. For consistent arguments, the correlation between belief change and reading times did not approach significance. These results support the relevance framework for induction but are difficult to accommodate under other approaches.

Quotients, exactness, and nuclearity in the operator system category

We continue our study of tensor products in the operator system category. We define operator system quotients and exactness in this setting and refine the notion of nuclearity by studying operator systems that preserve various pairs of tensor products. One of our main goals is to relate these refinements of nuclearity to the Kirchberg conjecture. In particular, we prove that the Kirchberg conjecture is equivalent to the statement that every operator system that is (min,er)-nuclear is also (el,c)-nuclear. We show that operator system quotients are not always equal to the corresponding operator space quotients and then study exactness of various operator system tensor products for the operator system quotient. We prove that an operator system is exact for the min tensor product if and only if it is (min,el)-nuclear. We give many characterizations of operator systems that are (min,er)-nuclear, (el,c)-nuclear, (min,el)-nuclear and (el,max)-nuclear. These characterizations involve operator system analogues of various properties from the theory of C*-algebras and operator spaces, including the WEP and LLP.

Common Ingroups and Complex Identities: Routes to Reducing Bias in Multiple Category Contexts

We tested the hypothesis that evaluative bias in common ingroup contexts versus crossed categorization contexts can be associated with two distinct underlying processes. We reasoned that in common ingroup contexts, self-categorization, but not perceived complexity, would be positively related to intergroup bias. In contrast, in crossed categorization contexts, perceived complexity, but not self-categorization, would be negatively related to intergroup bias. In two studies, and in line with predictions, we found that while self-categorization and intergroup bias were related in common ingroup contexts, this was not the case in crossed categorization contexts. Moreover, we found that perceived category complexity, and not self-categorization, predicted bias in crossed categorization contexts. We discuss the implications of these findings for models of social categorization and intergroup bias.

EEG decoding of semantic category reveals distributed representations for single concepts

Achieving a clearer picture of categorial distinctions in the brain is essential for our understanding of the conceptual lexicon, but much more fine-grained investigations are required in order for this evidence to contribute to lexical research. Here we present a collection of advanced data-mining techniques that allows the category of individual concepts to be decoded from single trials of EEG data. Neural activity was recorded while participants silently named images of mammals and tools, and category could be detected in single trials with an accuracy well above chance, both when considering data from single participants, and when group-training across participants. By aggregating across all trials, single concepts could be correctly assigned to their category with an accuracy of 98%. The pattern of classifications made by the algorithm confirmed that the neural patterns identified are due to conceptual category, and not any of a series of processing-related confounds. The time intervals, frequency bands and scalp locations that proved most informative for prediction permit physiological interpretation: the widespread activation shortly after appearance of the stimulus (from 100. ms) is consistent both with accounts of multi-pass processing, and distributed representations of categories. These methods provide an alternative to fMRI for fine-grained, large-scale investigations of the conceptual lexicon. © 2010 Elsevier Inc.

Musicking (beyond makers, listeners; impact of recognizing this category)

A specialist entry into the SAGE Encyclopedia on 'musicking'