Anatomising Irish Rebellion: the Cromwellian Delinquency Commissions, the Books of Discrimination and the 1641 Depositions

The recent digitisation of the 1641 depositions has opened up that large and controversial collection of manuscripts to renewed study. The significance of a substantial section of that archive generated in 1653-4 by the work of the Cromwellian delinquency commissions has hitherto been poorly understood. This article sheds new light on the workings of the commissions and on the ways in which the 'delinquency depositions' that they collected helped to shape the implementation of the Cromwellian and Restoration land settlements in Ireland. It also compares the Irish delinquency proceedings to the approach adopted by the Long Parliament in its dealings with royalists in England in the 1640s. In analysing the actual content of the depositions, the article focuses particular attention on County Wexford. The surviving delinquency depositions enable in-depth exploration of many facets of the 1641 rebellion and its aftermath in that region.

Dales, long lands, and the medieval division of land in eastern England

The long, parallel fields of the marshlands between the Fens and the Humber estuary in eastern England, which are recorded on nineteenth-century maps, were the result of the division of the wetlands that occurred particularly during the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. Areas of common fen pasture were partitioned between tenants to provide land for grazing and arable. Similar division also took place on the coastal strip and in the peat fen for land for salt-making and cutting fuel. These long strips, known as dales, are compared to similar areas in open fields in parts of Yorkshire and Northamptonshire, which have been discussed elsewhere. It is argued that the field shape is the result of a type of division in eastern England in which considerable emphasis was placed on case of partitioning land equitably.

The problem with law in books and law in computers - the oral nature of law

It is becoming clear that, contrary to earlier expectations, the application of AI techniques to law is not as easy nor as effective as some claimed. Unfortunately, for most AI researchers, there seems to be little understanding of just why this is. In this paper I argue, from empirical study of lawyers in action, just why there is a mismatch between the AI view of law, and law in practice. While this is important and novel, it also - if my arguments are accepted - demonstrates just why AI will never have success in producing the computerised lawyer.