Essays in dynamic optimal taxation: working experience, unemployment scarring and poverty

This thesis investigates the design of optimal tax systems in dynamic environments. The first essay characterizes the optimal tax system where wages depend on stochastic shocks and work experience. In addition to redistributive and efficiency motives, the taxation of inexperienced workers depends on a second-best requirement that encourages work experience, a social insurance motive and incentive effects. Calibrations using U.S. data yield higher expected optimal marginal income tax rates for experienced workers for most of the inexperienced workers. They confirm that the average marginal income tax rate increases (decreases) with age when shocks and work experience are substitutes (complements). Finally, more variability in experienced workers' earnings prospects leads to increasing tax rates since income taxation acts as a social insurance mechanism. In the second essay, the properties of an optimal tax system are investigated in a dynamic private information economy where labor market frictions create unemployment that destroys workers' human capital. A two-skill type model is considered where wages and employment are endogenous. I find that the optimal tax system distorts the first-period wages of all workers below their efficient levels which leads to more employment. The standard no-distortion-at-the-top result no longer holds due to the combination of private information and the destruction of human capital. I show this result analytically under the Maximin social welfare function and confirm it numerically for a general social welfare function. I also investigate the use of a training program and job creation subsidies. The final essay analyzes the optimal linear tax system when there is a population of individuals whose perceptions of savings are linked to their disposable income and their family background through family cultural transmission. Aside from the standard equity/efficiency trade-off, taxes account for the endogeneity of perceptions through two channels. First, taxing labor decreases income, which decreases the perception of savings through time. Second, taxation on savings corrects for the misperceptions of workers and thus savings and labor decisions. Numerical simulations confirm that behavioral issues push labor income taxes upward to finance saving subsidies. Government transfers to individuals are also decreased to finance those same subsidies.

Earnings Variability and Earnings Instability of Women and Men in Canada: How Do the 1990's Compare to the 1980's (Working Paper 25)

It seems to be generally assumed that earnings instability has increased in the last decade or so, as earnings inequality has widened, but is this indeed the case, and if so, to what degree? This paper builds on earlier U.S. work to look at the total variance in individuals’ earnings with a focus on the distinction between permanent earnings variation associated with factors such as human capital investments or other persistent worker attributes, and transitory earnings variation or instability for a given individual from one year to another. We find that there was an increase in overall earnings variability, especially for men, but that the greatest part of this increase was driven by the permanent component – that is, by a widening dispersion of (life-cycle) earnings differentials across workers. The increased volatility of workers’ earnings about their life-cycle earnings profiles played a secondary role in the overall increase in men’s earnings variability, whereas for women this effect was very small or even worked in the opposite direction (depending on the particular age group). Patterns by age and region are also investigated.