A Simple Model of Access and Capacity for Post-Secondary Schooling in Canada (Working Paper 40)

This paper develops a simple model of the post-secondary education system in Canada that provides a useful basis for thinking about issues of capacity and access. It uses a supply-demand framework, where demand comes on the part of individuals wanting places in the system, and supply is determined not only by various directives and agreements between educational ministries and institutions (and other factors), but also the money available to universities and colleges through tuition fees. The supply and demand curves are then put together with a stylised tuition-setting rule to describe the “market” of post-secondary schooling. This market determines the number of students in the system, and their characteristics, especially as they relate to “ability” and family background, the latter being especially relevant to access issues. The manner in which various changes in the system – including tuition fees, student financial aid, government support for institutions, and the returns to schooling – are then discussed in terms of how they affect the number of students and their characteristics, or capacity and access.

SENSORIMOTOR WORKING MEMORY CAPACITY LIMITS

Two novel studies examining the capacity and characteristics of working memory for object weights, experienced through lifting, were completed. Both studies employed visually identical objects of varying weight and focused on memories linking object locations and weights. Whereas numerous studies have examined the capacity of visual working memory, the capacity of sensorimotor memory involved in motor control and object manipulation has not yet been explored. In addition to assessing working memory for object weights using an explicit perceptual test, we also assessed memory for weight using an implicit measure based on motor performance. The vertical lifting or LF and the horizontal GF applied during lifts, measured from force sensors embedded in the object handles, were used to assess participants’ ability to predict object weights. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with sets of 3, 4, 5, 7 or 9 objects. They lifted each object in the set and then repeated this procedure 10 times with the objects lifted either in a fixed or random order. Sensorimotor memory was examined by assessing, as a function of object set size, how lifting forces changed across successive lifts of a given object. The results indicated that force scaling for weight improved across the repetitions of lifts, and was better for smaller set sizes when compared to the larger set sizes, with the latter effect being clearest when objects were lifting in a random order. However, in general the observed force scaling was poorly scaled. In Experiment 2, working memory was examined in two ways: by determining participants’ ability to detect a change in the weight of one of 3 to 6 objects lifted twice, and by simultaneously measuring the fingertip forces applied when lifting the objects. The results showed that, even when presented with 6 objects, participants were extremely accurate in explicitly detecting which object changed weight. In addition, force scaling for object weight, which was generally quite weak, was similar across set sizes. Thus, a capacity limit less than 6 was not found for either the explicit or implicit measures collected.

Essays in dynamic optimal taxation: working experience, unemployment scarring and poverty

This thesis investigates the design of optimal tax systems in dynamic environments. The first essay characterizes the optimal tax system where wages depend on stochastic shocks and work experience. In addition to redistributive and efficiency motives, the taxation of inexperienced workers depends on a second-best requirement that encourages work experience, a social insurance motive and incentive effects. Calibrations using U.S. data yield higher expected optimal marginal income tax rates for experienced workers for most of the inexperienced workers. They confirm that the average marginal income tax rate increases (decreases) with age when shocks and work experience are substitutes (complements). Finally, more variability in experienced workers' earnings prospects leads to increasing tax rates since income taxation acts as a social insurance mechanism. In the second essay, the properties of an optimal tax system are investigated in a dynamic private information economy where labor market frictions create unemployment that destroys workers' human capital. A two-skill type model is considered where wages and employment are endogenous. I find that the optimal tax system distorts the first-period wages of all workers below their efficient levels which leads to more employment. The standard no-distortion-at-the-top result no longer holds due to the combination of private information and the destruction of human capital. I show this result analytically under the Maximin social welfare function and confirm it numerically for a general social welfare function. I also investigate the use of a training program and job creation subsidies. The final essay analyzes the optimal linear tax system when there is a population of individuals whose perceptions of savings are linked to their disposable income and their family background through family cultural transmission. Aside from the standard equity/efficiency trade-off, taxes account for the endogeneity of perceptions through two channels. First, taxing labor decreases income, which decreases the perception of savings through time. Second, taxation on savings corrects for the misperceptions of workers and thus savings and labor decisions. Numerical simulations confirm that behavioral issues push labor income taxes upward to finance saving subsidies. Government transfers to individuals are also decreased to finance those same subsidies.

From Unemployment to Sustainable Livelihoods in Ottawa's Technology Sector (Working Paper 44)

Since submission of the draft report to the OECD‐LEED Program on 30 June 2007, a unique seven‐years retrospective study of the unemployed high technology workers was released by Statistics Canada.1 Drawing upon Statistics Canada’s confidential Longitudinal Worker File – itself constructed from four administrative data sources that linked Records of Employment and tax filer information by the Social Insurance Number and firm‐level data by a company identifier – this study was able to identify and trace the re‐employment of those permanently laid off in the high‐tech industry by location. The findings are stunning.