Does social context influence male mating tactics in Drosophila melanogaster?

Social context, such as mate availability and perceived competition, can influence a male’s mating tactics. In Drosophila melanogaster most research has investigated how physical interactions and the perceived levels of sperm competition alter mating behaviour. I wanted to know if males would respond to the perceived social environments without the presence of physical interaction. Using a unique apparatus, I altered focal males’ social context by separating them physically from a social environment using a screen. Focal males were either in: (i) the presence of rival males and mates, (ii) the presence of potential mates only, (iii) isolation, or (iv) the presence of rival males only. I also manipulated the period the focal male was conditioned to a social environment to assess if the timing of cues is important. My findings suggest that the duration of acclimation alters male mating tactics. Regardless of social environment, the duration a male was conditioned influenced copulation latency. Males that were conditioned to their social environment for the duration of the experiment had differing copulation latencies between environments. Males held in isolation took longer to successfully court females, and transferred less sperm during mating then experimental males in the presence of rival males. Additionally, copulation duration correlated with the number of sperm transferred. Overall, my results suggest that the social environment and the perceived competition level affect mating strategies even without physical interactions. Since this apparatus may trick flies into believing they are a part of a social group, while controlling the male mating status, future work could examine behavioural, genetic and physiological phenotype effects of the social environment for both sexes.

Language, Logos, and Social Ontology: Naturalist and Post-Naturalist Narratives of Human Rationality and Social Reality

I distinguish two ways that philosophers have approached and explained the reality and status of human social institutions. I call these approaches “naturalist” and “post-naturalist”. Common to both approaches is an understanding that the status of mind and its relation to the world or “nature” has implications on a conception of the status of institutional reality. Naturalists hold that mind is explicable within a scientific frame that conceives of mind as a fundamentally material process. By proxy, social reality is also materially explicable. Post-naturalists critique this view, holding instead that naturalism is parasitic on contemporary science—it therefore is non-compulsory and distorts how we ought to understand mind and social reality. A comparison of naturalism and post-naturalism will comprise the content of the first chapter. The second chapter turns to tracing out the dimensions of a post-naturalist narrative of mind and social reality. Post-naturalists conceive of mind and its activity of thought as sui generis, and it transpires from this that social institutions are better understood as a rational mind’s mode of the expression in the world. Post-naturalism conceives of social reality as a necessary dimension of thought. Thought requires a second person and thereby a tradition or context of norms that come to both structure its expression and become the products of expression. This is in contrast to the idea that social reality is a production of minds, and thereby derivative. Social reality, self-conscious thought, and thought of the second person are therefore three dimensions of a greater unity.