Poverty Dynamics: Empirical Evidence for Canada (Working Paper 29)

Poverty (low income) dynamics are explored using tax filer data covering the period 1992 to 1996. The distributions of short-and long-term episodes are identified, and reveal substantial differences by sex and family type. Entry and exit models explore the relationships between poverty transitions and sex, family status and other personal and situational attributes. Duration effects on exiting and re-entering poverty are found to be important, and models including past poverty experiences point to strong "occurrence dependence" for poverty entry and incidence. Fixed-effect panel data models confirm the above, and reveal asymmetries in the impacts of household transitions on poverty.

Analysis of Poverty Dynamics in Canada (Working Paper 9)

While we know much about poverty (or “low income”) in Canada in a static context, our understanding of the underlying dynamics remains very limited. This is particularly problematic from a policy perspective and the country has been increasingly left out on an international level in this regard. The contribution of this paper is to report the results of an empirical analysis of low income (“poverty”) dynamics in Canada using the recently available “LAD” tax-based database. The paper first describes the general nature of individuals’ poverty profiles (how many are short-term versus longterm, etc.)., the breakdown of the poor population in any given year amongst these different types, and the characterisation of poverty profiles by sex and family type. It then reports the estimation of various econometric models, starting with a set which specifies entry into and exit from poverty in any given year as a function of a variety of personal attributes and situational characteristics, including family status and changes therein, province of residence, inter-provincial mobility, language, area size of residence and calendar year (to capture trend effects). A set of proper hazard models then adds duration effects to these specifications to see how exit and re-entry probabilities shift with the amount of time spent in a poverty spell or after having exited a previous spell. A final set of specifications then investigates “occurrence dependence” effects by including past poverty spells first in an entry model and then with respect to the probability of being poor in a given year. Policy implications are discussed.

Essays in dynamic optimal taxation: working experience, unemployment scarring and poverty

This thesis investigates the design of optimal tax systems in dynamic environments. The first essay characterizes the optimal tax system where wages depend on stochastic shocks and work experience. In addition to redistributive and efficiency motives, the taxation of inexperienced workers depends on a second-best requirement that encourages work experience, a social insurance motive and incentive effects. Calibrations using U.S. data yield higher expected optimal marginal income tax rates for experienced workers for most of the inexperienced workers. They confirm that the average marginal income tax rate increases (decreases) with age when shocks and work experience are substitutes (complements). Finally, more variability in experienced workers' earnings prospects leads to increasing tax rates since income taxation acts as a social insurance mechanism. In the second essay, the properties of an optimal tax system are investigated in a dynamic private information economy where labor market frictions create unemployment that destroys workers' human capital. A two-skill type model is considered where wages and employment are endogenous. I find that the optimal tax system distorts the first-period wages of all workers below their efficient levels which leads to more employment. The standard no-distortion-at-the-top result no longer holds due to the combination of private information and the destruction of human capital. I show this result analytically under the Maximin social welfare function and confirm it numerically for a general social welfare function. I also investigate the use of a training program and job creation subsidies. The final essay analyzes the optimal linear tax system when there is a population of individuals whose perceptions of savings are linked to their disposable income and their family background through family cultural transmission. Aside from the standard equity/efficiency trade-off, taxes account for the endogeneity of perceptions through two channels. First, taxing labor decreases income, which decreases the perception of savings through time. Second, taxation on savings corrects for the misperceptions of workers and thus savings and labor decisions. Numerical simulations confirm that behavioral issues push labor income taxes upward to finance saving subsidies. Government transfers to individuals are also decreased to finance those same subsidies.