Essays on Firm Heterogeneity with Empirical Applications in Economic History and Agricultural Economics

This thesis uses models of firm-heterogeneity to complete empirical analyses in economic history and agricultural economics. In Chapter 2, a theoretical model of firm heterogeneity is used to derive a statistic that summarizes the welfare gains from the introduction of a new technology. The empirical application considers the use of mechanical steam power in the Canadian manufacturing sector during the late nineteenth century. I exploit exogenous variation in geography to estimate several parameters of the model. My results indicate that the use of steam power resulted in a 15.1 percent increase in firm-level productivity and a 3.0-5.2 percent increase in aggregate welfare. Chapter 3 considers various policy alternatives to price ceiling legislation in the market for production quotas in the dairy farming sector in Quebec. I develop a dynamic model of the demand for quotas with farmers that are heterogeneous in their marginal cost of milk production. The econometric analysis uses farm-level data and estimates a parameter of the theoretical model that is required for the counterfactual experiments. The results indicate that the price of quotas could be reduced to the ceiling price through a 4.16 percent expansion of the aggregate supply of quotas, or through moderate trade liberalization of Canadian dairy products. In Chapter 4, I study the relationship between farm-level productivity and participation in the Commercial Export Milk (CEM) program. I use a difference-in-difference research design with inverse propensity weights to test for causality between participation in the CEM program and total factor productivity (TFP). I find a positive correlation between participation in the CEM program and TFP, however I find no statistically significant evidence that the CEM program affected TFP.

Essays on Economics of Entrepreneurship

This dissertation examines three important issues. The first issue is about the human capital investment and entrepreneurship as a career choice. The standard human capital theory shows that firms (employees) never invest in general (firm-specific) human capital of the employee as they do not extract any return from it. However, when entrepreneurship is introduced as a career option for an innovative employee, both firm’s and employee’s human capital investments change. Employee starts investing in his firm-specific human capital to increase the probability to innovate (and to become an entrepreneur). However, the firm uses general human capital investment to reduce the risk of employee’s departure. The second issue is regarding the factors motivating entry regulations reforms and the possible nonlinear effects of entry regulation reforms. The current literature and the policy recommendations assume that these reforms have linear effects on entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, the anecdotal evidence shows that the outcomes of such reforms vary greatly from country to country. To investigate this issue, I collect a sample data on entry regulations and firm creation from World Bank. The empirical analysis indicates that the effect of entry regulation reforms depends on the pre-reform level of bureaucracy in the country. More specifically, while low-bureaucracy countries benefit from entry regulation reforms, high-bureaucracy countries do not benefit. Moreover, the probability of making a reform increases if the country has reformist neighbors, cumbersome entry regulations, high unemployment rate, or low corruption level. The last issue is related to the individual and joint effects of bureaucracy and corruption on different types of entrepreneurs. The current literature investigates these effects only on unified measures of entrepreneurship. However, entrepreneurs are very different in many senses. To address this issue, I collect the necessity-based and opportunity-based entrepreneurship data from Global Entrepreneurship Monitor. The empirical analysis yield two important results: First, bureaucracy has a direct negative (positive) effect on necessity-based (opportunity-based) entrepreneurs. Second, corruption mitigates the effect of bureaucracy for both groups of entrepreneurs. All three chapters offer useful insights and important implications to academics and policymakers.